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GLOBAL ECONOMIC CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE 
FUTURE OF GLOBAL TRADE 
ARI AFILALO* & DENNIS PATTERSON** 
ABSTRACT 
 
The global trade order that has been in place since the end of the 
Second World War is now in crisis.  Populism has broken out around 
the world, embraced by powerful forces in the United States and 
Europe.  This Article identifies the changes in the nature of the 
global constitutional order and domestic markets that resulted in the 
legitimacy crisis of the global trade order.  We proceed in four 
parts.  We begin by articulating the concept of a global economic 
constitution.  We then review the history of successive iterations of 
the global economic constitution, starting with the Industrial 
Revolution and continuing through the rise of today’s globalized, 
integrated markets.  In that historical context, we analyze the factors 
that explain the current crisis of legitimacy of the international 
economic order and that require a transition to a new global 
economic order.  These include:  the rise of a new class of 
disadvantaged members of the middle class, whom we call the 
“chronically excluded”; fundamental changes in the global supply 
chain; the rise of a global middle class competing for existing 
opportunities, which exceeds three billion members and which 
disproportionately grows in emerging markets; changes in the 
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nature of work, the corporation, and the scope and effectiveness of 
the governmental regulation.  We propose policy and institutional 
reforms, accounting for those changes.  These proposals will, we 
argue, usher in a new global economic constitution, one that will 
preserve the legitimacy of the global economic order. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The post-World War II liberalized trade order that enjoyed 
widespread acceptance for sixty years1 is now under attack and at 
risk of losing its legitimacy.  Powerful movements described as 
“populist” or “economically nationalist” have become major 
political forces in the very Western democracies that invented trade, 
pushing for their nations’ withdrawal from globalized markets.2  
Why have elections in major Member States of the European Union, 
such as Britain and France, become referenda on the very existence 
of the European enterprise?3  Why does the term “globalist” elicit 
                                                             
 1 See William L. Clayton, GATT, the Marshall Plan, and OECD, 78 Pᴏʟ. Sᴄɪ. Q. 
493 (1963) (reviewing the history of the post-World War II Marshall Plan and of the 
foundational reforms to the international trade system that removed tariffs and 
other regulatory barriers to trade: whereas tariffs had protected powerful minority 
economic interests, the Marshall Plan’s infusion of capital into the European 
economies after the end of the War, and the concurrent removal of obstacles to 
trade, enabled substantial segments of the European population to benefit from 
economic growth and achieved cross-border market integration that acted as a 
deterrent to conflict); J. Bradford De Long & Barry J. Eichengreen, The Marshall Plan: 
History’s Most Successful Structural Adjustment Program,  (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 3899, 1991), 
https://www.nber.org/papers/w3899.pdf [https://perma.cc/35DQ-P4UD] 
(describing that beyond its immediate economic boost, the Marshall Plan enabled 
sustained growth for industries, such as coal and steel, that had suffered far greater 
disruption during World War II than ever before in their history).  Cf. MATTHEW 
JOSEPH GABEL, INTERESTS AND INTEGRATION: MARKET LIBERALIZATION, PUBLIC 
OPINION AND EUROPEAN UNION 47–55 (2009) (discussing trade liberalization, its 
costs and benefits, and its general public approval in Europe after World War II). 
 2 See generally  JOHN B. JUDIS, THE POPULIST EXPLOSION (2016) (discussing how 
the great recession and economic pressures lead to a rise in populism around the 
world).  See also JAN-WERNER MÜLLER, WHAT IS POPULISM? (2016) (discussing and 
arguing how populism is truly a rejection of pluralism); BARRY EICHENGREEN, THE 
POPULIST TEMPTATION (2018) (discussing the connection between populism and the 
economy). 
 3 Candidates in the 2016 elections in France and the Netherlands who called 
for a referendum on EU membership garnered a substantial portion of the votes.  
See Kate Lyons & Gordon Darroch, Frexit, Nexit or Oexit? Who Will Be next to Leave 
the EU, Tʜᴇ Gᴜᴀʀᴅɪᴀɴ (June 27, 2016), 
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jun/27/frexit-nexit-or-oexit-who-
will-be-next-to-leave-the-eu [https://perma.cc/6YG4-J4MB].  See generally RONALD 
R. RAPOPORT & WALTER J. STONE, THREE’S A CROWD: THE DYNAMIC OF THIRD PARTIES, 
ROSS PEROT, AND REPUBLICAN RESURGANCE (2008) (discussing how, although there 
has always been opposition to trade, it traditionally was the domain of unions, 
environmental groups, and other groups representing interests adverse to market 
 
 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol40/iss2/1
2019] Global Economic Constitutionalism 327 
derision from a wide segment of the general public?4  Why do pillars 
of the international investment system, including financial centers 
like the United States and the United Kingdom, consider revoking 
investment treaties that, for decades, have signaled their 
commitment to liberalized capital markets?5  In this Article, we will 
                                                             
liberalization, or nationalists like Ross Perot, a 1992 U.S. Presidential candidate.  
Those critiques of trade had a much narrower impact than today’s populist 
movement, which stakes a claim to mainstream legitimacy). 
 4 The term “globalist” has entered the mainstream to become a slur 
denouncing advocates of the liberalized trade philosophy and open immigration 
policies that were once endorsed by all but fringe groups.  It is used regularly by 
supporters of President Trump.  See, e.g., Ben Shapiro, Why Trump Fans Keep Using 
The Slur ‘Globalist.’, Dᴀɪʟʏ Wɪʀᴇ (Aug. 2, 2016), 
http://www.dailywire.com/news/8024/why-trump-fans-keep-using-slur-
globalist-ben-shapiro [https://perma.cc/TQ45-QX82] (“[Today,] ‘globalism’ has 
become just a slur for Trump’s opponents, just as `neocon’ was disconnected by the 
left from its roots in the left-to-right transitional figures like Irving Kristol and used 
as a club against anyone who supported the Iraq war . . . .”).  See generally YORAM 
HAZONY, THE VIRTUE OF NATIONALISM 6 (2018) (“I will understand ‘globalism’ for 
what it obviously is—a version of the old imperialism.”). 
 5 See, e.g., Bob Davis, U.S. Bid to Exit Nafta Arbitration Panels Draws Ire From 
Businesses, Wᴀʟʟ Sᴛ. J. (Aug. 22, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-bid-to-
exit-nafta-arbitration-panels-draws-ire-from-businesses-1503423680 
[https://perma.cc/73XF-F5CC] (describing a proposal the Trump administration 
was organizing in order to allow NAFTA countries to opt out of the ISDS, an 
international arbitration system where corporations can sue governments for 
actions taken that improperly diminished the value of their foreign investments); 
Eric Martin, Trump’s Impatience Emerging as Biggest Threat to Nafta Agreement, 
BLOOMBERG POL. (Aug. 31, 2017),  
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-08-31/trump-s-impatience-
emerging-as-biggest-threat-to-nafta-agreement [https://perma.cc/BH7E-GUPZ]  
(describing how President Trump’s repeated threats to withdraw from NAFTA 
disrupted re-drafting and negotiation efforts in juxtaposition with the generally 
polite atmosphere of the other negotiators); Martin Pengelly, Trump Threatens to 
Terminate Nafta, Renews Calls for Mexico to Pay for Wall, Gᴜᴀʀᴅɪᴀɴ (Aug. 27, 2017), 
http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/aug/27/donald-trump-camp-
david-nafta-mexico-wall-canada [http://perma.cc/4S6N-4T8V] (recounting 
President Trump’s tweets calling NAFTA the “worst trade deal ever made” and 
threatening to terminate).  See also Joel P. Trachtman, Terminating Trade 
Agreements: The Presidential Dormant Commerce Clause versus an Historical 
Gloss Half Empty (Oct. 16, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3015981 [https://perma.cc/5GT3-R6B4] 
(noting that the political backlash against trade and associated threats to terminate 
trade treaties have generated scholarly commentary analyzing the constitutional 
allocation of power to effectuate fundamental changes to the trade commitments of 
the United States among executive, legislative, and judicial branches, and the 
checks and balances in place). 
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answer these and other questions as we ponder the future of global 
trade. 
Our analysis focuses on the constitutional architecture of the 
international trade system and the nature of the basic norms 
animating its relationship with the domestic State.  In order to secure 
legitimacy and function effectively, the international trade order 
must reflect the dominant constitutional order of the State at a 
particular time in history.6  By way of illustration, a trade system 
based on comparative advantage and liberalized cross-border 
commerce reflects a society of trading States dedicated to 
maximizing collective resources while maintaining effective internal 
regulatory power to redistribute wealth.  For its part, the domestic 
State must continuously adjust its foundational construct to address 
a wide array of factors including, among other things, competition 
in the international markets, technological advances, and changes in 
the nature of work or of the ethos of corporations.  When the State 
evolves to a new “socio-legal paradigm,” trade governance and 
institutions may become obsolete and ineffectual. 7 
Today, the rise of economic nationalism and the related crisis of 
legitimacy regarding Statecraft and trade governance stem from the 
unacknowledged disconnect between the transformation of the 
global marketplace and the present de jure status quo of domestic 
                                                             
 6 We take issue with scholars who argue that there is a fundamental 
inconsistency between liberalized trade and a sovereign and regulatorily 
autonomous democratic nation-state, and that opting for free trade by definition 
entails sacrificing some of the essential regulatory features of Western democratic 
legal systems.  Most prominently, Professor Dani Rodrik has posited that there is a 
“trilemma” requiring policy-makers to choose among nation-state sovereignty, the 
regulatory power of democratically elected representatives to adopt socio-
economic legislation, and free trade.  For Rodrik, preserving domestic sovereignty 
necessitates a retreat from free trade.  See Dani Rodrik, Feasible Globalizations (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9129, 2002), 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w9129.pdf [https://perma.ccBVH3-S3VW] 
(claiming that the nation-state system, deep economic integration, and democracy 
are mutually incompatible, and that we have to choose between the nation-state 
and international economic integration if we want to maintain and deepen 
democracy).  Rodrik’s trilemma holds that post-Bretton Woods economies must 
stem and contain hyperglobalization in order to preserve democratic sovereignty 
and national economic management.  See id.  In our view, as will be detailed below, 
the international trade system may be structured so as to enable free movement of 
goods without depriving participating states of their sovereign regulatory space, so 
long as the trade structure is adjusted to reflect changes in domestic constitutive 
legal features. 
 7 Sonia E. Rolland, Towards Post-Modern Trade Relations?, 5 JURIS. 173 (2014) 
(reviewing DENNIS PATTERSON & ARI AFILALO, THE NEW GLOBAL TRADING ORDER: 
THE EVOLVING STATE AND THE FUTURE OF TRADE (2008)). 
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and international policies.  The domestic State continues to rely on 
policies and programs that were developed for the pre-globalization 
20th century national markets.  Because its basic animating principles 
are also a reflection of 20th century markets and geopolitics, the 
international trade system perpetuates the paralysis.  As was the 
case before World War II, we find ourselves at a crossroads.  It is 
essential for policy makers to recognize the need for reform before 
the system becomes obsolete. Otherwise, without a proper 
foundation, the system crumbles. 
In this Article, we will articulate the contours of the new socio-
legal paradigm that we believe should govern the State’s basic 
construct today, and we will advance policy proposals for a 
reformed international economic order.  In Part 2, we set forth our 
understanding of constitutionalism in the global context.  We argue 
that a “global economic constitution” governs international markets 
and defines the basic components of the relationships among 
commercial actors.  We call it the “GEC.”  We distinguish the GEC 
from domestic constitutions in particular because the GEC is not 
supreme, immutable, and superordinate.  Rather, it is in the nature 
of the general architecture of the international order, embodying 
foundational norms that evolve through successive iterations that 
remain in effect only for discrete periods of time, and do not apply 
equally to all groups of actors.8  In Part 3, we will review the history 
of the GEC, starting with the Industrial Revolution and continuing 
through the rise of today’s globalized, integrated markets.  We 
divide the GEC into three periods, which we call GEC 1.0, 2.0, and 
3.0.  For each, we focus on the evolution of its basic norms and 
institutions, the relationship between the international and domestic 
realms, the economic and social actors to whom alternate norms 
apply, and the hallmarks of the legitimacy of the system. 
In Part 4, we analyze the factors that explain the current crisis of 
legitimacy of the international economic order and require a 
transition from GEC 2.0 to GEC 3.0.  In Part 5, we expand our 
understanding of what confers “legitimacy” on any given 
constitutional order, and we identify the basic norms that need to be 
overhauled in today’s rising GEC 3.0 order.  We propose policy and 
institutional reforms, accounting for changes in the nature of work, 
                                                             
 8 See generally  GOVERNANCE WITHOUT GOVERNMENT: ORDER AND CHANGE IN 
WORLD POLITICS (James N. Rosenau & Ernst-Otto Czempiel eds., 1992) (discussing 
the international order as depicted by nine institutional authors). 
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the corporation, the scope of governmental regulation, in addition 
to transformed international markets and institutions. 
2.  WHAT IS GLOBAL ECONOMIC CONSTITUTIONALISM? 
Is there a global economic constitution?  If so, what is it?  The 
idea of a constitution9 is so familiar, it may strike the reader as 
unnecessary of explication.  For Americans, the idea of a constitution 
is bound up with a written document executed at the nation’s 
founding.10  Stating basic principles of liberty and individual rights, 
and articulating a structure of government, a constitution of this sort 
is essential to the cultural understanding of a polity and is a 
constitutive feature of its political institutions.  The foundations of 
American constitutionalism are fixed at a core and timeless level, 
such that all recognized constitutionalists, whatever their political 
or legal philosophy, will converge and share (at least some) common 
ground. 
When we refer to a global economic constitution, on the other 
hand, we are not thinking about a projection of the American or 
other Western constitutional model on a global scale.  Rather, we 
have in mind a set of evolving, interlocking, and mutually 
reinforcing principles adhered to by a diverse group of sovereign 
states that is capable of applying different norms to different groups 
of actors.  The global economic constitution of which we speak is no 
mere congeries of rules, treaties, and laws.  To be sure, global 
economic constitutionalism is built on principles and institutions 
that are both widely shared and, to various degrees, mutually 
obligatory.  But the main feature of global constitutionalism is the 
integration of an economic ethos with a set of institutions, patterns 
                                                             
 9 As we will argue, by “constitution” we mean a set of animating principles 
wedded to norms and institutions that evolve dynamically. 
 10 See Michael J. Perry, The Authority of Text, Tradition, and Reason: A Theory of 
Constitutional Interpretation, 58 S. Cᴀʟ. L. Rᴇᴠ. 551, 555–56 (1985) (noting that the 
American Constitution is understood to embody the ratifiers’ beliefs about how the 
country was to be governed). 
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of inter-state relations, and legal regimes that are more or less all-of-
a-piece.11 
The global economic constitution differs from a domestic 
constitution in three fundamental respects that are pertinent to our 
analysis.  First, a domestic constitution is always supreme in the 
hierarchy of laws.12  The global economic constitution, on the other 
hand, does not displace inconsistent domestic measures unless a 
complex set of conditions obtains.13  Those conditions evolve over 
time, but not until the recent past did international law acquire 
limited supremacy, with built-in mechanisms allowing States to 
suspend compliance with their treaty obligations on a selective 
basis.14 
                                                             
 11 See James Tully et al., Introducing Global Integral Constitutionalism, 5 GLOBAL 
CONST. 1, 2 (2016) (explaining that global constitutionalism “refers to the global field 
of diverse, formal and informal assemblages of laws and governance, norms and 
actors that exhibit constitutional qualities.”). 
 12 See HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 221–24 (Max Knight trans., 1967) 
(arguing that a constitution states the grounding legal and democratic principles 
that its government is obligated to uphold, and because of this is considered the 
supreme law in a country to which all other laws must adhere). 
 13 See, e.g., Antonis Antoniadis, The European Union and WTO Law: A Nexus of 
Reactive, Coactive, and Proactive Approaches, 6 WORLD TRADE REV. 45, 46 (2007) 
(explaining that it is “well established that the Court of Justice has, in principle, 
denied the direct effect of WTO law in the Community and Member States’ legal 
orders.”); Armin Von Bogdandy, Pluralism, Direct Effect, and the Ultimate Say: On the 
Relationship between International and Domestic Constitutional Law, 6 INT’L J. CONST. L. 
404 (2008) (arguing that constitutional law has been “internationalized” and that 
the “pyramid” hierarchy of laws has been replaced by a sophisticated coupling of 
domestic law and global law).  Indeed, the extent to which international law 
displaces domestic law is one of the most sensitive constitutive questions of any 
international regime.  The legitimacy of the system and its acceptance by the partner 
States depends on whether the system sufficiently shelters domestic legal 
sovereignty.  The European Community, by way of example, came close to 
disintegrating because France feared that, after the planned transition from 
unanimity to majority voting, the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice 
that gave direct effect to European law and implied a preemption clause, would 
unduly expose France to the imposition of European norms.  See J.H.H. Weiler, The 
Transformation of Europe, 100 Yᴀʟᴇ L.J. 2403, 2406 (1991) (noting that the most 
significant change in Europe has been the evolving relationship between the 
Community and its Member States). 
 14 Until the establishment of the World Trade Organization in 1995, GATT 
panel decisions were not binding unless all Contracting Parties, including the losing 
State, accepted the decision.  See William J. Davey, The WTO and Rules-Based Dispute 
Settlement: Historical Evolution, Operational Success, and Future Challenges, 17 J. Iɴᴛ’ʟ 
Eᴄᴏɴ. L. 679 (2014) (discussing the historical evolution of the WTO dispute 
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Second, the domestic constitution speaks to all citizens and 
cannot have contradictory constitutional norms for different 
actors.15  It would be unthinkable to grant Texans the right to freely 
practice religion while restricting New Yorkers to Christianity.  The 
global economic constitution, on the other hand, can legitimately 
impose fundamental norms—such as its anti-discrimination 
principles—on one set of actors while exempting others.  In fact, the 
very survival of the global economic constitution depends on its 
ability to operate as a multipolar constitution.16  GEC 2.0, for 
example, recognized that emerging economies needed protection to 
consolidate.17  The anti-discrimination principles of GEC 2.0, which 
enshrined comparative advantage in the basic law of the trade order, 
applied to the industrialized economies of the Western modern 
liberal democracies.18  The “infant industries” of newly-independent 
                                                             
settlement system); see also Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Remedies Along with Rights: 
Institutional Reform in the New GATT, 88 AM. J. INT’L L. 477, 479–480 (1994) 
(describing the ineffectiveness of GATT panels, “where it was possible for the 
losing party before a GATT dispute to block adoption of a panel report, and this 
happened not infrequently.”).  This was consistent with other institutions like the 
International Court of Justice, which could not acquire jurisdiction without the 
consent of all parties, and which did not allow individual access to international 
justice.  See generally SHABTAI ROSENNE, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: AN 
ESSAY IN POLITICAL AND LEGAL THEORY (1957) (addressing the political and legal 
factors that helped establish the ICJ as well as its function within the international 
system). 
 15 See, e.g., John Rawls, The Domain of the Political and Overlapping Consensus, 64 
N.Y.U. L. Rᴇᴠ. 233, 234–235 (1989) (positing that a stable democratic regime must 
adhere to certain fundamental precepts accepted by diverse citizens who hold 
conflicting political and ideological positions). 
 16 See ERNST-ULRICH PETERSMAN, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW IN THE 21ST 
CENTURY 115–21 (2012) (discussing the importance of international economic 
cooperation through the acceptance of global legal pluralism in its ability to 
“enhance ‘voice’ and ‘discursive spaces’ for non-state actors . . . [and provide 
symmetric access] to specialized economic regimes and institutions . . . .”). 
 17 See Alexander Keck & Patrick Low, Special and Differential Treatment in the 
WTO: Why, When, and How?, in ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT & MULTILATERAL TRADE 
COOPERATION 147, 147–148 (Simon J. Evenett & Bernard M. Hoekman eds., 2005) 
(exploring the role of special and differential treatment in the multilateral trading 
system and offering new approaches for their continued utilization). 
 18 See Uche Ewelukwa, Special and Differential Treatment in International Trade 
Law: A Concept in Search of Content, 79 N.D. L. Rᴇᴠ. 831 (2003) (claiming that in the 
multilateral trade system developing countries benefit from better market access 
for their goods, rather than being subject to neutral application of the principles of 
comparative advantage, including, by way of example, certain exemptions from the 
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States, on the other hand, continued to be governed by the 
protectionist norms of GEC 1.0, which GEC 2.0 had rejected.19 
The third difference between a domestic constitution and the 
GEC is that the international constitution evolves in successive 
epochal iterations that, of necessity, must reject the fundamental 
tenets of their predecessor.20  The pattern of evolution of the global 
economic constitution follows the same course across each epochal 
iteration.  The constitutional architecture starts with building blocks 
defined by the “inner voice” of the individual States that dominate 
the system, their basic law.21  The GEC then coalesces around a set 
of principles that operates consistently with domestic Statecraft.22  
Over time, the domestic principles evolve, and the GEC must also 
transform itself to adjust.  In between constitutional epochs, the 
international system often traverses a perilous time where, almost 
of necessity, its operative norms conflict with domestic law and 
expose the system to economic crisis. 
Understanding the constitutional architecture of trade and its 
evolution is essential to maintaining domestic and international 
economic policies that are consistent with one another.  The failure 
to upgrade economic regimes in a timely fashion creates structural  
breakdowns that tend to affect the most vulnerable actors in the 
markets.  The vulnerable actors of today’s markets form the 
backbone of the populist, anti-trade movement.  The global 
economic order is on the cusp of an epochal change and in the midst 
of a transitional and perilous period.  The basic norms and 
                                                             
GATT and easier access to overseas markets designed to boost economic 
development through exports). 
 19 See generally SVEN BECKERT, EMPIRE OF COTTON: A NEW HISTORY OF GLOBAL 
CAPITALISM (2014).  For a superb historical account of protectionism, with special 
attention to the US context, see DOUGLAS A. IRWIN, CLASHING OVER COMMERCE: A 
HISTORY OF US TRADE POLICY 221–410 (2018). 
 20 We first advanced the idea of epochal transformation of States in DENNIS 
PATTERSON & ARI AFILALO, THE NEW GLOBAL TRADING ORDER (2006).  In this Article, 
we use digital numbering to identify each epoch of global economic 
constitutionalism.  See id.  In using this numbering, we follow the lead of Alexander 
Somek who uses this approach to great effect in ALEXANDER SOMEK, THE 
COSMOPOLITAN CONSTITUTION (2015).  For a review of that work, see Dennis 
Patterson, The Dark Future of Constitutionalism, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 667, 668 (2015) 
(book review) (reviewing Alexander Somek’s book, The Cosmopolitan Constitution, 
in which he argues that modern constitutionalism has gone through three phases: 
power, recognition, and transcendence). 
 21 See KELSEN, supra note 12, at 215. 
 22 See, e.g., Rodrik, supra note 6, at 24 (explaining that, while there are many 
possible models of feasible globalization, they are limited by the scope of 
institutional diversity at the national level). 
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assumptions that have animated the trading world since World War 
II are undergoing a radical transformation.  In the next two Parts of 
this Article, we briefly review how the GEC evolved through three 
distinct epochal iterations, from the Industrial Revolution to date, 
which we will call GEC 1.0, GEC 2.0 and GEC 3.0.  In addition to the 
constitutional architectural rules of the international system and its 
relationship to domestic law, we focus on the economic actors that 
are the principal interlocutors of the international system, which we 
will also define. 
3.  THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF GEC:  FROM THE INDUSTRIAL 
REVOLUTION TO THE FALL OF THE BERLIN WALL 
We identify three successive iterations of the international 
economic system that can be distinguished from one another based 
on their constitutive features.  Those we call GEC 1.0, “pre-modern 
state-nation,” 2.0, “modern welfare nation-state,” and 3.0, 
“postmodern globalized nation-state.”23  We differ from the 
prevailing narratives about the evolution of Statecraft and trade in 
that we reject both what we call the “positive evolutionary account” 
of trade history, and its counterpart—advocated most powerfully by 
the prominent economist Dani Rodrik—that there are inherent flaws 
in the trade system that make it inconsistent with a democratic, 
welfare-promoting State.24  In our narrative, trade and Statecraft 
have not evolved toward an optimal system that we must defend as 
the best possible structural option.  In addition, trade and Statecraft 
have the capacity, in any given epoch, to enable the welfare of 
market actors on a widespread basis if the right policy choices are 
made.  In this Part, we outline the historical evolution of Statecraft 
and trade with a view to illustrating our thesis. 
                                                             
 23 See generally PHILIP BOBBITT, THE SHIELD OF ACHILLES: WAR, PEACE, AND THE 
COURSE OF HISTORY 144–242 (2003). 
 24 See, e.g., Rodrik, supra note 6, at 13 (“[T]he nation-state system, deep 
economic integration, and democracy are mutually incompatible.”). 
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3.1.  GEC 1.0:  From the Industrial Revolution to World War I:  State-
Centric Growth. 
GEC 1.0 spans the period starting with the Industrial Revolution 
and ending with World War I.  The principal constitutional feature 
of GEC 1.0 is what we call a “Union of Delinked States.”  The trading 
partners and dominating powers in GEC 1.0 included principally 
European States and the United States of America.25  GEC 1.0 States 
followed an economic ethos, internationally and domestically, 
intended to foster and consolidate their internal markets.26  
Although some international agreements were signed to enable 
trading, “trade was consistently regarded as a form of warfare, as a 
vast game of beggar-my-neighbor, rather than as a collaborative 
activity from the extension of which all stood to benefit.”27  The 
global architecture of GEC 1.0 enabled State-centric policies to 
operate virtually free of enforceable international obligations and 
International Institutions’ oversight.  This normative and 
institutional structure reflected the trading States’ view of the global 
markets as competitive fields, from which they would seek to draw 
resources to support their internal consolidation enterprise.28 
                                                             
 25 Of course, active trade outside the Western world predated GEC 1.0.  The 
Silk Road trade and the Arabian sheikdom, for example, predate European 
commerce.  See Rolland, supra note 7, at 179.  However, we focus on the powers that 
led to the establishment of the modern trade system. 
 26 See MARK BLAUG, ECONOMIC THEORY IN RETROSPECT 10–14 (1997) (illustrating 
the mercantilist mindset, where states viewed their trade with neighbors as zero-
sum and mutually antagonistic); see also ROBERT GILPIN, GLOBAL POLITICAL 
ECONOMY: UNDERSTANDING THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 43 (2011) (“[T]he 
primary concern of states was to acquire a favorable balance of trade/payments to 
finance their external military and political ambitions.”). 
 27  See John Linarelli, How Trade Law Changed: Why It Should Change Again, 65 
MERCER L. REV. 621 (2004) (citing League of Nations report looking back at inter-
war trade system and reviewing prior history of short-lived commercial treaties 
during the Industrial Revolution.  For example, in the mid-18th century, trade 
between France and Great Britain was stifled.  An embargo was in place and only 
smuggling was possible.  The Anglo-French Commercial Treaty of 1786 liberalized 
trade of French wines and silk and British textiles and manufactured products). 
 28 See Sol Picciotto, Networks in International Economic Integration: Fragmented 
States and the Dilemmas of NeoLiberalism,  17 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 1014, 1022–23 
(1997) (arguing that emerging trade regulation and industrialization policy in the 
late 19th and early 20th centuries “reinforced national sovereignty, in the sense that 
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In GEC 1.0, the foundational domestic law of each State (“State 
Law”) was also designed to foster concentration of capital towards 
industrialization and massive urbanization goals.  States solidified 
legal codes protecting contracts and property rights.  They tolerated 
periods of “boom-and-bust” with little in the way of a social safety 
net.  They did not feature an evolved system of protection of 
workers’ economic security.29  The overall effect and purpose of 
these policies was the solidification of an internal market within 
each trading State, a project which partially explained (if not 
justified) the relative paucity of regulation, welfare and 
administrative control of the market for the purpose of helping 
Labor.30  The nature of the Industrial Revolution was consistent 
with, and shaped, the architecture of Statecraft.  The economies of 
the emerging Western liberal democracies shifted rapidly from an 
agrarian model to an urban and manufacturing base.  Railroads, 
waterways, ocean, and other means of transportation of industrial 
output required capital concentration and a large labor force.31  The 
manufacturing concerns supported this infrastructure-creation 
effort and began to organize into factory networks that launched the 
era of production for gradually expanding consumer societies.32  The 
seeds of a Middle Class,33 which today exceeds three billion people 
                                                             
the substance of regulation was generally left to national processes of 
legitimation . . . .”). 
 29 See generally JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE GREAT CRASH (1954) (arguing 
that the leading causes of the 1929 crash, high speculation and high optimism, are 
intrinsic to America’s economic psychology).  Galbraith lists income inequality and 
wealth hoarding, poor or nonexistent leveraging in the banking system to prevent 
loss of savings, and inflexibility in government regulation as contributors of the 
economic crash.  Id. 
 30 We are using the term “Labor” in the context of GEC 1.0 to capture in broad 
fashion the working class that generally was employed in factories and other mass 
production centers of manufactured goods.  See generally BRIAN GREENBERG, THE 
DAWNING OF AMERICAN LABOR: THE NEW REPUBLIC TO THE INDUSTRIAL AGE (2017) 
(exploring the meaning of labor amid industrialization in post-civil war America). 
 31 See, e.g., SAMUEL P. HAYS, THE RESPONSE TO INDUSTRIALISM 1885–1914 22–23 
(2d ed. 1995). 
 32 See generally TYLER STOVALL, TRANSNATIONAL FRANCE: THE MODERN HISTORY 
OF A UNIVERSAL NATION (2015) (highlighting how modernization of Paris had 
spurred consumerism and infrastructure investments). 
 33 Our use of the term “Middle Class” is relative to economic stratification in 
each GEC iteration and to the States or groups of States (e.g., the Western victors of 
World War II) at issue.  We do not address broad sociological and political 
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worldwide, were planted.34  The building effort was assisted by the 
relatively laissez-faire policies of the State and its mercantilist 
approach.35 
The international order reflected the domestic architecture and 
did not necessitate complex rules of trade.36  Instead, the GEC 
essentially delinked markets so as to enable them to consolidate free 
of international regulation.37  The constitutional order was 
characterized by a mercantilist economic norm.38  Mercantilism was 
an unambiguous corollary of a state-centric view of sovereignty, and 
the economic norm for a power-based system of international 
relations.39  States allocated their resources to industrialize and build 
internal markets and industries, and GEC 1.0 created an 
                                                             
questions such as the relationship between economic status and political power.  
Rather, we seek to broadly define the Middle Class as the economically similarly 
situated segment of the population that finds itself between Labor and an upper 
class.  Oftentimes, as in our discussion of the Global Middle Class, see infra Section 
4.1, the Middle Class will be defined in reference to income bracket.  This is a 
common way of identifying the Middle Class for the purposes of a particular study.  
See, e.g., The American Middle Class is Losing Ground, PEW RES. CTR. (Dec. 9, 2015), 
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2015/12/09/the-american-middle-class-is-
losing-ground/ [https://perma.cc/3BEH-848U] (defining middle class for 
purposes of study as “adults whose annual household income is two-thirds to 
double the national median, about $42,000 to $126,000 annually in 2014 dollars for 
a household of three.”). 
 34 See generally JOHN HINSHAW & PETER N. STEARNS, INDUSTRIALIZATION IN THE 
MODERN WORLD: FROM THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION TO THE INTERNET 313 (2013). 
 35 See BLAUG, supra note 26, at 10–14 (recognizing a mercantilist approach as a 
means to encourage investment through a favorable balance of trade without public 
investments or monetary intervention). 
 36 See Picciotto, supra note 28, at 1023 (recognizing that the forms of 
coordination respected and indeed reinforced national sovereignty by leaving the 
substance of regulation to  national processes of legitimation). 
 37 See id. at 1022–1031 (suggesting that many of the key institutions between 
1865 and 1914 were developed through cross-border debate, emulation, and 
coordination). 
 38 See GILPIN, supra note 26, at 196–197 (highlighting steadily growing trade 
protection from latter decades of the 19th century up to and during the Great 
Depression of the 1930s); Peter A. Gourevitch, International Trade, Domestic 
Coalitions, and Liberty: Comparative Responses to the Crisis of 1873–1896, 8 J. INTERDISC. 
HIST. 281, 289 (1977) (suggesting that rising tariffs during late 19th century may be 
driven by political explanations that favor protectionist forces at the expense of free 
traders). 
 39 See generally ROBERT KAGAN, OF PARADISE AND POWER: AMERICA AND EUROPE 
IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER (2004). 
 
 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2019
338 U. Pa. J. Int'l L. [Vol. 40:2 
international system with relatively few cooperative frameworks, 
and no multilateral International Institutions of the type that arose 
in GEC 2.0.40  The colonialist policies of Europe and, to a much lesser 
extent, the United States, complemented economic protectionism 
and the understanding of trade as a form of war served to solidify 
the homeland.  The “periphery” was viewed as a competitive field 
from which to draw resources.41  As the major European States 
carved out Africa, Asia, and South America, they played another 
zero-sum game where their relative power defined the outcome.42 
Each GEC contains the seeds of its own demise and, over time, 
GEC 1.0 fueled and fostered a constitutional architecture that made 
it unwise to continue to operate the international economic order as 
a Union of Delinked States with common policies allowing their 
internal markets to solidify free of interventionist policies.43  GEC 1.0 
resulted in the creation of relatively well-defined nations, and the 
consolidation of an internal market delineated by national 
boundaries.  By 1918 and the adoption of the Treaty of Versailles, 
the GEC 1.0 State-Nation had morphed into a collective of nation-
states that formed the League of Nations and launched a new era of 
international collaboration.44  Internally, those States witnessed the 
rise of a new Middle Class, with a large Labor component as the 
                                                             
 40 See Picciotto, supra note 28, at 1029–32 (illustrating how the voluntarism that 
followed from state sovereignty made it hard to achieve agreement on a multilateral 
arrangement of any substance). 
 41 See Fazlollah Bonakdar Shirazi, An Empirical Assessment of the Center-
Periphery Hypothesis in International Economic Relations (1988) (unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation, Portland State University), 
http://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2205&context=op
en_access_etds [https://perma.cc/P3TG-YJH4] (emphasizing the role played by 
periphery countries as object of exploitation by center countries by producing 
primary and agricultural products). 
 42 See BLAUG, supra note 26, at 10–14 (recounting theories defending 
mercantilism as appropriate in promoting national autarchy and expansion of state 
power). 
 43 See Picciotto, supra note 28, at 1032–38 (highlighting the obvious need to 
strengthen the international system when it came to planning the foundation for 
the post-war global order). 
 44 The Treaty of Versailles itself contained many economic legal provisions 
that set forth principles that advanced the global economic regime in the following 
decades.  See BEATRIZ HUARTE MELGAR, THE TRANSIT OF GOODS IN PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (2015) (citing Steve Charnovitz, What is International Economic 
Law, 14 J. INT’L ECON. L. 3, 9 (2011)). 
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backbone of industrialized manufacturing.  This Middle Class 
coalesced into the principal interlocutor of the State, and the ethos 
of Statecraft shifted from market consolidation to ensuring the 
welfare of the Middle Class.45  Given that transformational shift, the 
delinked, State-centric nature of GEC 1.0 was no longer consistent 
with the ethos of the evolved Statecraft. 
In the next Section, we discuss the transition from GEC 1.0 to 
GEC 2.0, and the principal features of the constitutional order that 
arose after World War II. 
3.2.  GEC 2.0:  The Rise of the Western Middle Class and the 
Administrative State. 
A common trope of trade history holds that the modern liberal 
democracies erred when they adhered to mercantilism in the first 
place, and that they corrected this historical mistake when they 
moved toward liberalized trade after World War II.46  The corollary 
of this account is that comparative advantage, the economic basis for 
liberalized trade, is a timeless truth that should always inform 
economic and trade policy.47  That is the essence of the “positive 
evolutionary account” of trade history that we referenced in the 
introduction.  We disagree.  Until the conditions for comparative 
advantage were ripe, including in particular the consolidation of a 
Middle Class-backed internal market coextensive with national 
borders, States were simply not ready to transition to GEC 2.0.  The 
tragedy of the post-World War I period is not that States failed to 
correct a historical mistake, but that they did not recognize in time 
that by 1918 the GEC had evolved and that its foundational 
principles required adjustment.  There is nothing timeless about 
comparative advantage any more than there was anything timeless 
about GEC 1.0.  Comparative advantage is simply an economic 
ethos, appropriate for a specific set of market circumstances and 
market actors in a discrete historical time period.  In fact, the modern 
liberal democracies were late in recognizing the need to overhaul 
                                                             
 45 See MARK WALSH, PAUL STEPHENS & STEPHEN MOORE, SOCIAL POLICY AND 
WELFARE 28–50 (2000) (detailing how social policy through the 20th century in the 
United Kingdom developed to emphasize social welfare). 
 46 See GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF MACROECONOMICS 182–83 (8th ed. 2018) 
(providing an anecdote demonstrating the benefits of liberalized trade).  For a 
detailed history, see generally IRWIN, supra note 19, at 276–508. 
 47 See id. at 183. 
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the system because they suffered from the same reflex of familiarity 
that reinforces the belief that comparative advantage is timeless. 
As we explained above, the GEC reflects the integration of an 
economic ethos with a set of institutions, patterns of inter-state 
relations, and legal regimes that are more or less all of a piece.  The 
economic ethos of GEC 2.0—liberalized trade through comparative 
advantage—was an unequivocal rejection of mercantilism.  It was 
not enough, however, for the founders of GEC 2.0 to reject 
protectionist policy from the standpoint of economics.  As a 
condition to acceptance of the system by the founding Western 
liberal democracies, the GEC 2.0 framers also had to craft a legal 
regime that would not interfere with the sovereign regulatory power 
of the Administrative Nation-State.48  The International Institutions, 
and their relationship to the domestic State, had to be such so as not 
to impose redistributive choices on the Contracting Parties.  Tariffs 
would go down.  Taxation and regulation would not be allowed to 
discriminate against foreign goods, but at least in theory 
international law would allow the Contracting Parties complete 
freedom to redistribute the expanded global pool of assets, based on 
unimpeded domestic choices.  This was the Bretton Woods 
compromise, which we describe in salient parts below.  This 
institutional arrangement, which was at the heart of GEC 2.0, led to 
40 years of growth and general constitutional balance in trade and 
Statecraft. 
GEC 2.0 was built from the bottom up, starting with the 
transformed nature of State Law.  The competing ideologies of 
Statecraft after World War I sought to capture the support of the 
newly-coalesced Middle Class.  Their legitimacy came to depend on 
that wide base, rather than the narrower coalition of Capital and 
ruling classes that drove GEC 1.0.  The 20th century modern liberal 
democratic model offered to a wide segment of the Middle Class a 
system of economic security and potential upward mobility 
revolving around a powerful Administrative State.  Extending 
economic opportunities such as those widely available to the Middle 
                                                             
 48 See Steven Bernstein & Erin Hannah, Non-State Global Standard Setting and 
the WTO: Legitimacy and the Need for Regulatory Space, 11 J. INT’L ECON. L. 575 (2008) 
(discussing the need for the WTO to refrain from social and environmental standard 
setting). 
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Class in the 20th century was revolutionary.49  The preceding 
economic orders granted this level of wealth only to an exceedingly 
small segment of society.50 
To accomplish this goal, for the modern liberal democracies, 
State Law in the age of GEC 2.0 focused on the delivery of welfare 
to the Middle Class via a massive bureaucracy comprising the 
Administrative State.  Welfare included a social safety net and tools 
for equalizing opportunities (unemployment, disability, health care, 
education, etc.).51  Governments utilized Keynesian and other 
interventionist policies to regulate economic cycles and mitigate 
boom-and-bust swings.  They adopted economic and social 
measures of general applicability intended to protect the Middle 
Class.  Those included investor and consumer protection, health and 
occupational safety, and environmental conservation, in addition to 
a wide and sophisticated social safety net.52  Each major State 
followed a road to welfare that, while using different means (e.g., 
                                                             
 49 See generally PHILIP BOBBITT, supra note 23 at 144-45. 
 50 See THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 350–64 (Arthur 
Goldhammer trans., 2014) (arguing that wealth is often accumulated in capitalistic 
societies by whole classes of people that can bring generational defects; when r (rate 
of return on capital) is greater than g (rate of economic growth), wealth becomes 
accumulated overtime, leading to inequality and social distress); id. at 479–87 
(calling for interventionist policies to address the accumulation of wealth and the 
associated social issues). 
 51 See PETER FLORA & ARNOLD J. HEIDENHEIMNER, DEVELOPMENT OF WELFARE 
STATES IN EUROPE AND AMERICA 22–28 (1981) (providing an overview of the 
development and goals of the welfare states generally and their specific iterations 
in various European and North American countries). 
 52 See Sar A. Levitan, How the Welfare System Promotes Economic Security, 100 
POL. SCI. Q. 447 (1985) (positing that social welfare was established in two principal 
waves, the New Deal and the 1960s and 1970s, and evolved into an increasingly 
more expansive and sophisticated safety net encompassing retired, unemployed, 
disabled, and other groups of people who fell off the wide employment-based self-
support structure).  Our definition of welfare, as will be seen below, is much 
broader.  We reference a complex network of evolving relationships, including 
between government, capital, labor, the middle class, and international institutions; 
as well as a set of norms and social structures that govern those relationships, which 
evolve and, at any particular stage of social history, determine the economic 
security and opportunity of various societal groups. 
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indicative planning or tax-and-spend), was designed to provide the 
nation with a minimum level of economic security.53 
GEC 2.0 has aptly been described as the “corporate welfare 
state.”54  Policymakers grounded the delivery of welfare in a stable 
base of corporations with large balance sheets and payrolls, whose 
mission was to supply career jobs to the Middle Class as much as to 
generate profits for Capital.  After World War II, Capital joined with 
the State to establish “full employment” as the foundational goal for 
the American economy.  The Roosevelt Administration had 
convened the Committee for Economic Development (CED) during 
the War.55  It was comprised of a group of large corporation 
executives who were dedicated to structuring their activities so as to 
give employment to the 58 million war workers.56  Its platform 
                                                             
 53 See GØSTA ESPING-ANDERSEN, THE THREE WORLDS OF WELFARE CAPITALISM 
26–33 (1990) (describing three distinct welfare-state regimes and their political 
economies). 
 54 See STEVEN MAY ET AL., THE DEBATE OVER CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 
4–6 (2007) (recounting the historical development of corporate social responsibility 
and industrial welfare programs). 
 55 See Marc Linder, Eisenhower-Era Marxist-Confiscatory Taxation: Requiem for 
the Rhetoric of Rate Reduction for the Rich, 70 TUL. L. REV. 905, 933 (1996) (“[T]he 
Committee for Economic Development (CED) . . . prescrib[ed] a long-range 
program of reduction in the highest individual income tax rates as a priority in 
order to restore incentives . . . .”); COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, 
FEDERAL TAX ISSUES IN 1955 6–7 (1955) (reviewing the priorities for tax reduction of 
the Roosevelt Administration); Report Urges April 1 Tax Drop if Spending is Cut By 5 
Billion, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 1954 (reporting on suggested tax rate reductions against 
projected cuts in government spending in 1954).  For the composition of the CED 
and an account of its ultimate merger with the Conference Board in 2015, see The 
Conference Board to Merge with the Committee for Economic Development: Venerable 
Organizations with Complementary Missions Join Forces, CISION PR NEWSWIRE (Jan. 14, 
2015), https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/the-conference-board-to-
merge-with-the-committee-for-economic-development-300020593.html 
[https://perma.cc/RFB6-HWCT] (noting that since 1942 the members of the CED 
have been the country’s top business executives as well as policy experts). 
 56 See generally  JERRY DAVIS, BROOKINGS, CAPITAL MARKETS AND JOB CREATION 
IN THE 21ST CENTURY (Dec. 30, 2015), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2016/07/capital_markets.pdf [https://perma.cc/E7SN-4MK3] 
[hereinafter DAVIS, CAPITAL MARKETS] (detailing the stability of the large American 
corporations during the Great Depression and WWII eras and the rise of capital 
markets and corporate employment). 
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became the animating principle of economic policy after World War 
II, through a continued public-private partnership.57 
With this welfare structure in place, the State could focus on the 
regulation of its interlocutors:  the corporations that succeeded GEC 
1.0 Capital as drivers of growth and continued industrialization.  
Whereas the previous economic order allowed Capital to privilege 
growth free of structural obligations towards Labor,58  the new order 
assigned to its corporations the responsibility for first-line delivery 
of the welfare basket to its Labor force, including, for instance, 
healthcare, retirement, and savings plans.  The State leaned on the 
corporation to respect minimum welfare standards, including 
conditions of employment.  It regulated the commons to limit 
market failures, externalities, and other harms to the socio-economic 
expectations of the Middle Class.59  And it could legislate protection 
for those who fell out of the corporate welfare net, employing 
programs of general applicability such as unemployment, disability 
benefits, and of course retirement benefits. 
The Bretton Woods treaties of international trade that 
dominated GEC 2.0 crafted norms protective of the States’ ability to 
administer and deliver welfare while expanding their collective 
resources through free trade (Embedded Liberalism).60  
                                                             
 57 See Robert M. Collins, Positive Business Responses to the New Deal: The Roots 
of the Committee for Economic Development  1933–1942, 52 BUS. HIST. REV. 369 (1978) 
(explaining how the New Deal laid the groundwork for public-private partnership 
and commitment to full employment, and despite occasional contentious relations 
between America’s corporate leaders and the Administration during the 1930s and 
1940s, influential groups like the Business Advisory Council led the drive to join 
the private sector and government in a joint effort to ensure full employment). 
 58 See generally DAVID FAIRRIS, SHOPFLOOR MATTERS: LABOR MANAGEMENT 
RELATIONS IN TWENTIETH CENTURY MANUFACTURING 12–13 (2016) (discussing the 
evolving relationship between labor and management in the decades preceding and 
following World War II). 
 59 See Gerald F. Davis et al., The Decline and Fall of the Conglomerate Firm in the 
1980s: The Deinstitutionalization of an Organizational Form, 59 AM. SOC. REV. 547 (1994) 
(reviewing corporate history and describing the rise of the American corporation 
as an institution that provided welfare benefits such as healthcare, retirement, and 
savings plans in the twentieth century; these large corporations were the result of 
careful acquisitions and conglomeratization; the “firm-as-portfolio” model meant 
multiple smaller firms could be acquired—even if their businesses were 
unrelated—and a wide net of people could be employed by one corporation). 
 60 See John Gerard Ruggie, Embedded Liberalism Revisited: Institutions and 
Progress in International Economic Relations, in PROGRESS IN POSTWAR INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIONS 203 (Emanuel Adler & Beverly Crawford eds., 1991) (defining embedded 
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Comparative advantage as an economic principle joined with a legal 
system protective of regulatory autonomy to replace the 
mercantilist/protectionist model.  As Keynes put it, the lawyers 
were the “poets of trade” in that they invented norms and 
institutions that would at once liberalize the movement of goods 
across borders and shelter national welfare.  This replaced the 
institutions-free, zero-sum game of GEC 1.0.  The Middle Class, as 
the principal interlocutor and protected subject of the State law, was 
sheltered from the international institutions by a system that 
essentially allowed the State to veto conflicting norms of 
international law when it deemed its middle class to be threatened.61 
Additionally, and in the same spirit, while the treaties 
established International Institutions to manage and regulate trade, 
the regime was minimally intrusive on national sovereign 
regulatory space.  The GATT was firmly grounded in the 
international legal tradition of highly limited, State-to-State 
enforcement.  Unlike the European system, it gave each Contracting 
Party ample discretion to “selectively exit” the norms of the system.  
For example, the “positive consensus rule” required that all 
Contracting Parties approve a judicial determination that a violation 
had occurred before the applicable GATT Panel decision could 
become binding.62  States also routinely made rational choices, 
                                                             
liberalism as a construct where “international economic order would be 
multilateral in character” but with this multinationalism “predicated upon 
domestic interventionism”).  See generally DANI RODRIK, The Political Trilemma of the 
World Economy, in THE GLOBALIZATION PARADOX: DEMOCRACY AND THE FUTURE OF 
THE WORLD ECONOMY 187–207 (2011) (presenting the possibility of leveraging well-
crafted rules of globalization to enhance the operation of national democracies). 
 61 See generally PATTERSON & AFILALO, supra note 20, at 74 (stating that states 
“chose the framework underlying the GATT because it allowed them to maintain 
their domestic architecture as they entered into an international framework that 
expanded the global economic pie.  The main players’ commitment to an 
interventionist welfare state ensured that the economic project would be married 
to a political redistributive enterprise . . . . Democracy vanquished communism not 
(only) on the battlefield, but in managing to raise standards of living and 
establishing a welfare system that integrated into the national economic whole the 
working classes that were the target of communism’s ideological war.” (citations 
omitted)). 
 62 See WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, HISTORIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE DISPUTE 
SETTLEMENT SYSTEM, 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/disp_settlement_cbt_e/c2s1p1
_e.htm [https://perma.cc/3B54-3CY9] (“The rudimentary rules in Article 
XXIII:2 of GATT 1947 provided that the contracting parties themselves, acting 
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mindful of their own violations, to carefully determine which 
regulations to challenge and which to let stand. 
The foundational trade norms were also designed to shelter the 
national regulatory space.  The GATT, and later the WTO, 
accomplished the work of trade liberalization through decades of 
tariff reduction,63 challenges to non-tariff barriers to trade ranging 
from quota-like licensing requirements to environmental and health 
measures adversely impacting foreign products,64 and other gradual 
                                                             
jointly, had to deal with any dispute between individual contracting parties.  
Accordingly, disputes in the very early years of GATT 1947 were decided by rulings 
of the Chairman of the GATT Council.  Later, they were referred to working parties 
composed of representatives from all interested contracting parties, including the 
parties to the dispute.  These working parties adopted their reports by consensus 
decisions.”). 
 63 See infra text and data accompanying footnotes 70 through 73, which 
illustrate the dramatic cuts in tariffs that have gradually occurred after barriers to 
trade peaked in the 1930s, as well as the correlation between tariff cuts and 
economic growth.  Those numbers  reflect the fundamental change in the basic 
animating principles of the international trade order, from protectionism to 
comparative advantage-based trading.  See also Robert E. Baldwin, The Changing 
Nature of U.S. Trade Policy Since World War II, in THE STRUCTURE AND EVOLUTION OF 
RECENT U.S. TRADE POLICY 5 (Robert E. Baldwin & Anne O. Krueger eds., 1984) 
(discussing the trend of tariff reduction in the post World War II period). 
 64 There are a number of fiscal and custom measures affecting the import of 
foreign cigarettes into Thailand.  These include customs valuations practices, health 
taxes, and retail licensing requirements.  In 2008, the Philippines requested 
consultation with Thailand claiming these measures were administered in an 
unreasonable manner and that the domestic versus foreign licensing requirements 
were a violation.  See Panel Report, Thailand–Customs and Fiscal Measures on 
Cigarettes from the Philippines, WTO Doc. WT/DS371/24 (adopted June 1, 2018).  The 
United States had a ban on shrimp and shrimp products from countries that did not 
have measures in place to prevent the capture of sea turtles, also known as Section 
609 of the Public Law 101–162.  In 1996, India, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Thailand 
requested consultations with the United States claiming this ban was a violation of 
Articles I, XI, and XIII of the GATT 1994.  The United States eventually conceded to 
the Article XI claim by not putting forward a defending argument.  See Appellate 
Body Report and Panel Report pursuant to Article 21.5 of the DSU, United States—
Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/23 
(Nov. 26, 2001).  In 2009 the United States passed the Family Smoking Prevention 
Tobacco Control Act which bans clove cigarettes in its Section 907.  Indonesia 
requested a consultation with the United States in 2010 claiming that this Section 
violated Article III of the GATT 1994.  The Appellate Body of the case found that 
the architecture, implementation, and operation of this Section had a detrimental 
effect on the clove cigarettes from Indonesia.  See Notification of a Mutually Agreed 
Solution, United States—Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes, 
WTO Doc. WT/DS406/17 (Oct. 9, 2014). 
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liberalizations of cross-border commerce.65  The principal 
constitutional norms effectuating comparative advantage were tariff 
reduction with most-favored nation treatment to all Contracting 
Parties, anti-discrimination (“national treatment”), the ban on 
measures having an effect equivalent to a quantitative restriction, 
and the resulting “tariffication” of obstacles to trade into transparent 
taxes at the border that was effectuated (with respect to goods) by 
the national treatment and no-quota basic norms.66  This construct 
was intended to relegate all non-tariff barriers to trade transparent 
tariffs, which themselves were subject to successive rounds of 
negotiation.  GEC 2.0, then, was designed to enable global growth 
while leaving the States free to maintain redistributive policies of 
their choice. 
Parallel to the global integrationist project, regional economic 
communities began to integrate into trading blocs.67  In those blocs, 
regional political objectives customarily worked hand-in-hand with 
economic objectives.68  The European Communities, and later the 
European Union, sought to end the catastrophic wars of European 
enmity, in particular those between France and Germany.69  The 
                                                             
 65 See, e.g., Understanding the WTO: Basics–The Uruguay Round, WORLD TRADE 
ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact5_e.htm 
[https://perma.cc/Q9JK-K4XM] (last visited Feb. 2, 2018) (recounting substantial 
progress achieved in the Uruguay Round); Understanding the WTO: The 
Agreements—Tariffs: More Bindings and Closer to Zero, WORLD TRADE ORG., 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm2_e.htm 
[https://perma.cc/T5UJ-CFJ9] (last visited Feb. 2, 2018) (highlighting countries 
commitments to cut and “bind” their customs duty rates on imports of goods). 
 66 See, e.g., Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, Multilateral Trade Negotiations, 
Bilateral Opportunism and the Rules of GATT/WTO, 67 J. INT’L ECON. 268 (2004) 
(highlighting the central role played by non-discrimination (MFN) and reciprocity 
in preserving “the welfare of non-participating government and therefore offer[ing] 
a first line of defense against bilateral opportunism.”). 
 67 See Gordon M. Gough & Sivakumar Venkataramany, Regional Economic 
Cooperation, 5 INT’L BUS. & ECON. RES. J. 49, 52–53 (2006) (examining the most 
influential regional trading blocs: EU, NAFTA, MERCOSUR, and ASEAN). 
 68 See generally APARAJITA ENDOW, FRANCE, GERMANY AND THE EUROPEAN 
UNION: MAASTRICT AND AFTER 1–3 (2003); ROBERT KAGAN,  supra note 39. 
 69 See generally Robert Schuman, The Schuman Declaration (May 9, 1950),  
available at https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/symbols/europe-
day/schuman-declaration_en [https://perma.cc/6BEL-L2D9] (declaring that the 
pooling of coal and steel production—with equal access and identical terms 
available to France and Germany—would make war between the traditional 
enemies not only “unthinkable” but also “materially impossible.”). 
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North American Free Trade Agreement aimed at providing Mexican 
laborers with domestic opportunity motivated, in part, to stem the 
flow of illegal immigration into the United States.70  The political 
goals of the system defined the extent to which constituent States 
retained their sovereignty; for example, more in North America than 
in Europe.  In all instances, however, sovereignty occupied a central 
role in the design of the international regime. 
The tariff reduction work of the GATT was extremely successful.  
Witness the drop in the average tariff on United States imports that 
took place during GEC 2.0 as compared to GEC 1.0: 
 
 
The growth function of liberalized trade for national economies 
was also achieved.  States experienced greater growth after cutting 
their own tariffs and meaningfully participating in the globalized 
markets.  The figures below, showing the drastically improved 
growth rates of four States in the years following their undertaking 
massive tariff reduction, are representative of the generally positive 
impact of liberalized trade on the growth of the States practicing it: 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
 70 Louis Uchitelle, Nafta Should Have Stopped Illegal Immigration, Right?, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 18, 2007), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/18/weekinreview/18uchitelle.html 
[https://perma.cc/ECF4-FT5N] (NAFTA “held out an alluring promise: the 
agreement would reduce illegal immigration from Mexico.”); see also SUBHRENDU 
BHATTCHARYA, GLOBALIZATION AND A SHRUNKEN WORLD 130 (2008). 
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By 1990, and the fall of the Berlin Wall, it was widely accepted 
that trade was a core component of the Western liberal democratic 
system that prevailed over Fascism and Communism.  Democracies 
could effectively redistribute resources and protect their most 
vulnerable.  The trade system was successfully structured to enable 
the Administrative State to accomplish that goal. 
Nevertheless, we posit that after 1990, the global markets and 
market actors entered into an age of “high-gear globalized 
integration,” which drastically changed the nature of the GEC 2.0 
globalized markets, and gradually made it essential to begin a 
transition from GEC 2.0 to GEC 3.0.71  This phenomenon had several 
manifestations which included, but also went well beyond, the 
integration of markets: 
(i) A shift of economic power from the virtually exclusive 
province of the Western liberal democracies that founded the GATT 
towards emerging economies, and the correlated gradual erosion of 
the Western Middle Class; 
(ii) The expansion of trade to new areas of commerce, in 
particular services, and the rise of a sophisticated network of 
investment treaties that, together with the information technology 
revolution, enabled capital to follow rapidly into new opportunities 
in the globalized markets; 
                                                             
 71 For a detailed account of the role of information technology in this process, 
see generally RICHARD BALDWIN, THE GREAT CONVERGENCE (2016). 
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(iii) The rise in the West of a large class, which we call the 
Chronically Excluded, that lost the ability to compete in the 
globalized economy, and the concurrent rise of a Middle Class 
located in the emerging economies that were not taken into account 
when the GEC 2.0 constitution was created; 
(iv) Growing lack of effectiveness of the GEC 2.0 welfare system 
and Administrative State, in the face of the changed market 
conditions; 
(v) Resulting failure of the international trade order, which 
relies on effective national economic policies to address the 
inequalities created by the globalization of markets; 
(vi) Changes in the nature of work, and in the make-up of the 
corporate base for the administration of welfare; 
(vii) Technological breakthroughs that create uncertainty as to 
the nature of the skills needed to compete for future jobs. 
In the next Part of this Article, we explore the transformational 
shifts and explain why they mark the dawn of a new GEC and make 
it necessary to overhaul GEC 2.0. 
4.  HIGH-GEAR GLOBALIZED INTEGRATION AND THE RISE OF GEC 3.0 
4.1.  Rise of the Global Middle Class:  America’s Chronically Excluded. 
GEC 2.0 initially was an enterprise launched by and for Western 
liberal democracies that, although by different means and priorities, 
generally pursued similar objectives through their respective 
version of the Administrative State.  The entry of emerging 
economies into the global market resulted in the natural course of 
the Bretton Woods enablement of global commerce in the rise of a 
new and vast global supply chain.  For the first time in literally 
hundreds of years, the locus of economic power started to shift back 
from the West to the Far East.  We will analyze the impact of this 
and other transformative patterns from a U.S.-centric standpoint. 
The shift in economic power generated a massive transfer of 
employment opportunities from the United States to the emerging 
economies.  The first wave of “tradable” American jobs was 
principally in the manufacturing sector.  In 1970, the highest global 
exporters of goods—measured by aggregate value added for 
exports—were: the United States at $290 billion, Asia, including 
China, at $155 billion and Europe, at $140 billion.  China itself only 
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reported $34 billion annually.  The trend began to change in the mid-
1990s when East Asia experienced a major upswing in 
manufacturing.  By 2015, the global total value Asia added in the 
manufacturing sector was worth $759 trillion, with $377 trillion 
allocated to China alone.  The United States and Europe were at $282 
trillion and $147 trillion, respectively. 
The gradual transformation of national markets into an 
integrated global market resulted in the rise of what we call the 
“Global Middle Class,” a central feature of GEC 3.0.  The correlative 
outcome, on the domestic level, was the erosion of the welfare and 
economic security of the national Middle Class of the modern liberal 
democracies that created and was the base of the Bretton Woods 
system.72  Consider the following figures:73  In 1950, the worldwide 
Middle Class numbered approximately 250 million people, most of 
whom were located in Western Europe, the United States, and 
Japan.  In 1985, approximately 150 years after the start of the 
Industrial Revolution, the Global Middle Class had reached 1 billion 
people.  By the end of 2016, the Global Middle Class—defined as 
households of four earning from $14,600 to $146,000—numbered 3.2 
billion.  140 million people join the Global Middle Class annually, 
and the figure is expected to reach 170 million in five years. 
The overwhelming majority of the new members joining the 
Global Middle Class annually—by one count as many as 88%—is 
based in Asia.  The Middle Class in the liberal democracies that won 
the War, prominently including the United States, is stagnant or 
slow-growing at best.  Significantly, the “most dynamic segment of 
the global middle-class market is at the lower end of the scale, 
among new entrants with comparatively low per capita spending.”74  
                                                             
 72 See Nouriel Roubini, The Political Left and Right Are Being Upended by 
Globalization Politics, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 23, 2016, 10:12 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/nouriel-roubini/globalization-
politics_b_11655494.html [https://perma.cc/S5H4-VY7L] (illustrating how losers 
of globalization increasingly find champions of anti-globalization to challenge 
mainstream orthodoxies of left and right politics). 
 73 See June Zaccone, Has Globalization Destroyed the American Middle Class? 
2–6 (June 2012) (unpublished manuscript), http://njfac.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/07/GloblMClass.pdf [https://perma.cc/HFR9-ANUU]. 
 74 Homi Kharas, The Unprecedented Expansion of the Global Middle Class: An 
Update, (Brookings Global Econ. & Dev., Working Paper No. 100, 2017), 2, 
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2017/02/global_20170228_global-middle-class.pdf 
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In the rest of the world, primarily in the jurisdictions that joined the 
global markets in the wake of their liberalization, it is fast growing.75 
At the same time, as we will explain in greater detail below, the 
Middle Class of the founding States of the GATT, like the United 
States, split into distinct sub-classes: 
(i) Capital, made up of entrepreneurs, investors, and other 
holders of equity in the transformed companies driving the 
economy and more traditional industries, together with their top 
executives.  This Capital class amassed a disproportionately higher 
amount of resources than it had in GEC 2.0; 
(ii) a mid-level and upper Middle Class, usually urban-based, 
for whom economic security and social mobility remained at levels 
above the average of the global Middle Class; and 
(iii)  a new and growing Class, which we will call the Chronically 
Excluded, that is significantly worse off than it was in GEC 2.0 and 
is in decline rather than aspiring toward upward mobility. 
The Chronically Excluded comprise the stagnant Middle Class 
of the United States, as well as other modern liberal democracies, 
and the base of economic populism.76  The emergence of the 
                                                             
[https://perma.cc/TH8B-J9VM] (noting that, by his calculation, the growth of the 
Middle Class includes 88% of new entrants from Asia, and that such growth is due 
to both rising populations and incomes). 
 75 See id. at 10–13.  For economic models anticipating this as a result of free 
trade, see Emily Blanchard & Gerald Willmann, Trade, Education, and the Shrinking 
Middle Class, 99 J. Iɴᴛ’ʟ Eᴄᴏɴ. 263 (2016); Ferdinando Monte, Skill Bias, Trade, and 
Wage Dispersion, 83 J. Iɴᴛ’ʟ Eᴄᴏɴ. 202 (2011).  Those models note that globalization 
affects developing and developed countries in different ways.  When countries that 
are already developed experience globalization, growth is disproportionately 
allocated to the segments of the population that tend to be better educated and work 
in export-orientated fields.  When countries that are still developing experience 
globalization, on the other hand, there is an increased demand for unskilled 
workers and the production of goods that necessitate less skilled labor input. 
 76 Policymakers in Western liberal democracies have been slow to recognize 
the relationship between populist movements and the condition of the Chronically 
Excluded.  In his December 10, 2018 address responding to the unprecedented 
social unrest caused by the “yellow jackets” protest, France’s President Emmanuel 
Macron acknowledged that the crisis pertains to “persons in a situation of handicap, 
whose place in society is not sufficiently recognized.”  “Their distress does not date 
from yesterday,” he added, “but we cowardly wound up getting used to it, and at 
bottom, everything happened as if they were forgotten, erased.”  Verbatim: Le 
discours d’Emmanuel Macron face aux «gilets jaunes»,  LE MONDE (Dec. 10, 2018), 
https://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2018/12/10/le-verbatim-de-l-
allocution-televisee-du-president-de-la-republique_5395523_823448.html 
 
 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2019
352 U. Pa. J. Int'l L. [Vol. 40:2 
Chronically Excluded is a crucial component of our story.  We 
distinguish them from the rest of the Middle Class for the following 
reasons: neither the State nor the International Institutions, which 
are for the most part still following the GEC 2.0 model, are designed 
to foster their economic and social security.77  The welfare system in 
countries like the United States was built for GEC 2.0, when the State 
relied on a corporate base of employers that no longer exists or has 
been substantially eroded.78  Even if the income of the Chronically 
Excluded is comparable to that of the lower rungs of the rising 
Middle Class in emerging economies, the Chronically Excluded are 
not similarly situated because their prospects for upward mobility 
and meaningful, secure employment are dimmed by the relocation 
of industries that are natural outlets for their skills.  In emerging 
markets, on the other hand, this trend is reversed and the lower rung 
of the Middle Class has access to opportunities for upward mobility 
relative to its current economic status. 
In the Sections that follow, as we review the other transformative 
changes that are marking the dawn of GEC 3.0, we will discuss 
further how they impact the Chronically Excluded.  At the outset, 
however, we need to address the claim that full employment in the 
American economy as of this writing negates the argument that 
international trade, coupled with the other transformative patterns 
that we have identified, has created a Chronically Excluded class.  In 
other words, is there really a socio-economic problem, or are we 
perhaps dealing with other causes for disenchantment, such as 
immigration, cultural warfare, or another less tangible cause?  Our 
first response is based on current data.  While unemployment is at 
an historic low, wages have stagnated in the United States.  The 
economic turnaround since the Great Recession has seen a decrease 
in the quality of jobs available in the labor market.  While 
employment has gone back up, the wages prevailing in the 
marketplace have failed to keep pace.  Workers are often employed 
in jobs that do not match their previous skill set, which they had 
                                                             
[https://perma.cc/CJE5-FFSD] (“C’est celle des plus fragiles, des personnes en 
situation de handicap dont la place dans la société n’est pas encore assez reconnue.  
Leur détresse ne date pas d’hier mais nous avions fini lâchement par nous y 
habituer et au fond, tout se passait comme s’ils étaient oubliés, effacés.”). 
 77 See Zaccone, supra note 73, at 11–13, 16 (explaining how globalization is 
causing the splintering of the middle class and institutions lag behind social and 
economic reality). 
 78 See DAVIS, CAPITAL MARKETS, supra note 56, at 3–4 (describing the 
transformation of the corporate sector from diversified conglomerates into smaller, 
more industrially focused firms). 
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used in tradable jobs.  To illustrate the decrease in wage levels, 
consider the chart below, which shows the total compensation share 
of GDP being on an overall declining curve, from 1970 to 2016: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Second, employment data does not include the workers who 
have completely dropped out of the labor market, or who are 
marginally attached to one or more tenuous jobs.  People who had 
reliable, consistent employment fell out of the labor force, or 
switched to part-time, low paid, or home care work.79  Regional 
disparities are also stark.80  The Chronically Excluded tend to be 
located in former manufacturing regions, and overall data can 
obscure the numbers that accurately measure their conditions.  
When the data is analyzed not only per State rather than nationally, 
but county by county within States, the lack of upward mobility and 
                                                             
 79 See Megan Dunn, Steven E. Haugen, and Janie-Lynn Kang, The Current 
Population Survey—Tracking Unemployment in the United States for Over 75 Years, 
MONTHLY LAB. REV. (Jan. 2018), https://doi.org/10.21916/mlr.2018.4 
[https://perma.cc/3W4A-VQU8] (“Although the number of people unemployed 
and the unemployment rate had dropped below levels experienced before the 
recession . . . [m]ore than 8 years after the end of the recession, about one-quarter 
of the unemployed were looking for work for 6 months or longer, still high by 
historical standards, and about 5 million people who wanted full-time work had to 
settle for part-time work.  This, coupled with a prolonged period of low labor force 
participation rates, resulted in continued interest in alternative measures of labor 
underutilization, since the broader measures were associated with larger groups of 
people experiencing labor market difficulties.”). 
 80 See generally ENRICO MORETTI, THE NEW GEOGRAPHY OF JOBS (2012) 
(highlighting that communities like Menlo Park and Visalia, even though they are 
geographically close, could not be more different in terms of job prospects, 
education, and wealth). 
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meaningful employment faced by the Chronically Excluded 
becomes undeniable.81 
Our next claim involves a prediction for the future, grounded in 
the current patterns that we have identified.  In the following 
Sections, we will explain our rationale for predicting that the 
Chronically Excluded will face an ever-narrowing spectrum of 
opportunities.  The trends in the evolution of the globalized 
marketplace leave them increasingly vulnerable to economic 
insecurity and inability to compete.  Further, the number of 
Chronically Excluded is bound to expand drastically, because of the 
current structural inability of the system to address the changes 
associated with the rise of GEC 3.0.  Whether it be tradability of retail 
and other services jobs to which the Chronically Excluded have 
flocked, technological advances that require skills to which the 
Chronically Excluded do not have access, or regional paralysis, the 
trend is not in favor of a rebound unless appropriate policy changes 
are made.  Another recession would also have a devastating effect 
on the Chronically Excluded and those who will join their ranks, 
absent a panoply of government tools ready to be deployed. 
4.2.  Regional Conglomeration vs. Regional Decline 
The geopolitical map of the international trade system on which 
GEC 2.0 was predicated distinguished among Nation-States.  The 
                                                             
 81 See, e.g., Brian Thiede and Shannon Monnat, The Great Recession and 
America’s Geography of Unemployment, 35 DEMOGRAPHIC RES. 891, 907, 916–917 
(2016).  Thiede and Monnat posit that researching county unemployment is a more 
insightful way of understanding joblessness in the United States.  While between-
state unemployment rates have declined since the recession of 2008, between-
county unemployment has risen.  There are also higher than average 
unemployment rates in different sectors of the economy—especially highly cyclical 
sectors.  The recession’s impact on county-level unemployment rates, for example, 
were found to be above the national average (7.90% to 20.95% +) in county clusters 
in the deep South, the Ohio River Valley, and the Southwest.  See U.S. DEP’T OF 
LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STAT., NEWS RELEASE  
https://www.bls.gov/regions/midwest/news-
release/countyemploymentandwages_indiana.htm [https://perma.cc/5CVW-
2LBM] (finding that in pocketed areas across the United States, wage growth has 
slowed; for example, in the State of Indiana, the study found that average weekly 
wages approximated the national average in only 7 out of 102 counties). 
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boundaries of the decolonized States of the second half of the 20th 
century were often co-extensive with the less privileged economic 
zones.  Those States were described successively as “less developed 
countries,” “developing countries,” and as they began to compete 
meaningfully in the global markets, “emerging economies.”82  
Today, the more accurate map of the globalized markets would 
focus on regions, industries, and economic sub-groups within 
States.  Emerging economies are fueled by regional manufacturing 
powerhouses that have secured large shares of the global supply 
chain.  In the United States, the opposite trend obtains.  Declining 
regions within the United States are home to the Chronically 
Excluded.  Especially in the lower-skilled sectors, entrants to the 
Global Middle Class from emerging economies are gradually 
conquering the markets.  The upshot is that, in the emerging East, 
powerful economic zones drive growth, whereas in the United 
States and other Western liberal democracies, declining regions that 
have lost manufacturing bases to the globalized markets lead the 
decline. 
A common myth about trade is that the principal comparative 
advantage that allowed countries like China to become 
manufacturing powerhouses is a low-wage base of workers.  While 
labor is obviously an important component of the cost of goods, 
carefully-crafted State policies and programs also have driven 
growth to a substantial extent.  Policies enabling regional 
conglomeration illustrate this proposition.83  In emerging 
economies, regional conglomeration was the result of export-
oriented and indicative policies that created integrated economic 
                                                             
 82 See generally Nicholas Lamp, The “Development” Discourse in Multilateral 
Trade Lawmaking, 16 WORLD TRADE REV. 475, 487  (2017).  The international trade 
system relied heavily on these distinctions to establish different countries’ ability to 
commit and comply with the international liberal market regime at various stages 
of their development.  This “temporal othering” allowed different sets of standards 
to be used for purposes of developmental economics and its legal expression.  For 
example, less-developed countries would, ideally, benefit from policies that 
increase their population’s ability to purchase goods from the global economy. 
 83 See generally ASEAN Secretariat, ASEAN Investment Report 2016: Foreign 
Direct Investment and MSME Linkages, http://asean.org/storage/2016/09/ASEAN-
Investment-Report-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/R7XD-WBF9] (last visited Nov. 2, 
2018) (arguing that regional production networks are the backbone of Asian 
manufacturing base and likely to provide the basis for a future $2.5TN single 
market of over 600 million people). 
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zones designed to respond to identified needs of the global markets.  
Those policies enabled the growth of industry by subsidizing and 
enabling the establishment of industry concentrations.84 For 
example, China’s “Foxconn cities” are conglomerates built as a 
concentrated, massive network of factory and support services to 
manufacture Apple’s (and other large companies’) electronic goods, 
by Foxconn Technology Group, a Taiwanese multinational 
electronics company.  Foxconn cities established their own eCMMS 
business model of e-enabled components, modules, moves, and 
services—a vertically integrated one-stop shop that is considered 
one of the shortest supply chains globally:85 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This all-inclusive manufacturing model, enabled by years of 
official export-promoting policies, has made Foxconn extremely 
desirable as a contract manufacturer for companies like Apple, 
Nintendo, and Motorola.86  These “one-stop shop” supply chains 
                                                             
 84 See DANI RODRIK, STRAIGHT TALK ON TRADE: IDEAS FOR A SANE ECONOMY 186–
87 (2017). 
 85 See Hon Hai Precision Industry Co. LTD, 2015 Annual Report (2016), 
http://www.foxconn.com/Files/annual_rpt_e/2015_annual_rpt_e.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4PC4-EP4X]; Business Philosophy, HON HAI FOXCONN TECH. 
GROUP, http://www.foxconn.com/GroupProfile_En/BusinessPhilosophy.html 
[https://perma.cc/88MW-HD7Y] (last visited Nov. 2, 2018). 
 86 See Charles Duhigg & Keith Bradsher, How the U.S. Lost Out on iPhone Work, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/22/business/apple-america-and-a-
squeezed-middle-class.html [https://perma.cc/39GK-VMT4] (discussing how 
there is nothing like Foxconn in the United States; it assembles an estimated 40 
percent of the world’s consumer electronics for customers like Amazon, Dell, 
Motorola, and Nintendo). 
 
 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol40/iss2/1
2019] Global Economic Constitutionalism 357 
were built in China and around the world.87  They are sometimes 
referred to as “campuses” and can be found throughout the world 
(e.g., Brazil, India, Japan, and Slovakia).88  The rise of regional 
conglomeration is a telling example of the success of deliberate 
indicative and export-promoting policies of the emerging 
economies, in contrast to the failure of U.S. policies to stem the 
regional dislocation and inequalities that this country has 
experienced over the past couple of decades. 
The developmental impact can be illustrated by the growth of 
manufacturing in Shenzhen, China, which was designated a special 
economic zone by the Chinese government in 1980.  It immediately 
began attracting business investment and corporations seeking 
bases of operations.  The government massively subsidized and 
enabled the growth of related industries that benefited from their 
proximity to one another.  Now, a city that was a fishing village of 
30,000 in the late 1970s, is a 10-million strong, major special 
economic zone89: 
                                                             
 87 See Dawn Chmielewski, Where Apple Products Are Born: A Rare Glimpse Inside 
Foxconn’s Factory Gates, RECODE (Apr. 6, 2015), 
https://www.recode.net/2015/4/6/11561130/where-apple-products-are-born-a-
rare-glimpse-inside-foxconns-factory [https://perma.cc/E6EM-KCGQ] 
(explaining how Foxconn and Pegatron, another Apple supplier, create their supply 
chain empires). 
 88 See FOXCONN, SPJ PARTNERS, http://www.spjintl.com/spj_foxconn.html 
[https://perma.cc/7YE7-T9E4] (last visited Nov. 2, 2018) (listing Foxconn’s 
numerous  operational units all over the world). 
 89 See generally Gar-On Antony Yeh, Development of the Special Economic Zone in 
Shenzhen, The People’s Republic of China, 52 EKISTICS 154 (1985). 
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On the other hand, U.S. industries already dislocated by national 
trends and technological changes are being completely wiped out 
by their inability to compete in the global supply chain.  In the 
apparel/textiles industry, for example, the combination of these 
factors resulted in an almost total loss of manufacturing market 
share for United States concerns.  Employment in the apparel 
industry, in 1948, was about 1.1 million.  Employment peaked in 
1973 at 1.4 million.  At that time, the United States produced about 
95% of its apparel.90  From 1994 to 2005, the United States lost about 
900,000 textile and apparel jobs.91  According to recent Department 
of Labor Statistics, apparel manufacturing employed about 109,000 
people as of June 2017.92  Virtually all of the manufacturing of U.S. 
apparel is now done abroad. 
Textile mills were previously substantial employers nationwide, 
with concentration in regions like New England.  Since the 
beginning of the Industrial Revolution, “mill towns” had become 
centers of employment and production in textiles. 
The economic activities of those New England towns first shifted 
down south to the Carolinas and other regions, where they became 
viable industries in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s.93  The continued 
                                                             
 90 See Lauren A. Murray, Unraveling Employment Trends in Textiles and Apparel, 
118 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 62, 62–66 (1995) (discussing the textile and apparel 
industries and explaining relationships between employment and investment 
within them). 
 91 See U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. ECON. RESEARCH SERV., U.S. TEXTILE AND APPAREL 
INDUSTRIES IN RURAL AMERICA (Oct. 10, 2017), 
https://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/crops/cotton-wool/background/us-textile-
and-apparel-industries-and-rural-america.aspx [https://perma.cc/CY2M-36HT] 
(stating that the United States lost more than 900,000 textile and apparel jobs 
between 1994 and 2005). 
 92 See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, INDUSTRIES AT A GLANCE: APPAREL 
MANUFACTURING: NAICS 315, https://www.bls.gov/iag/tgs/iag315.htm 
[https://perma.cc/2U8Y-QMDT] (last visited Dec. 9, 2017) (detailing yearly 
employment and labor statistics in the apparel manufacturing subsector). 
 93 See John F. Kennedy,  New England and the South, ATLANTIC (Jan. 1954), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1954/01/new-england-and-
the-south/376244/ [https://perma.cc/2U8Y-QMDT] (publishing three incisive 
speeches by then Junior Senator from Massachusetts, John F. Kennedy, criticizing 
labor practices that led to a migration of jobs from New England to the South).  Not 
surprisingly, the migration of textile mills and jobs to the South was also negatively 
regarded by the newly unemployed in the North.  Kennedy argues that the 
 
 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol40/iss2/1
2019] Global Economic Constitutionalism 359 
decline of American textile mills was caused by both technological 
innovation and the tradability of jobs.  From the 1950s to 1990s, 
technology allowed production to increase while employment 
decreased.  Tradability of jobs, and the lower wages in the Far East, 
completed the demise of the American apparel manufacturing 
industry.94 
The steel industry tells a similar story of regional dislocation:   
technological inroads causing decreased demand for labor, and 
ultimately transplantation of the industry abroad.  This story, 
however, also features the United States’ failure to promote and 
foster the infrastructural developments that would have been 
necessary for U.S. steel to compete.  The decline of employment in 
steel mills began with the growing reliance on centralized 
production with blast furnaces, Bessemer converters, and open-
hearth furnaces.95  Better technology meant fewer workers were 
needed to run plants.  As production increased in the late twentieth 
century, employment rolls declined.  Then, as a result of both wage 
                                                             
movement of jobs to the South was partially due to federal tax exemption programs 
and cheaper operations costs.  See id. 
 94 See Justin Fox, Manufacturing Moved South, Then Moved Out, Bʟᴏᴏᴍʙᴇʀɢ 
OPINION (Oct. 7, 2015), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2015-10-
07/manufacturing-moved-south-then-it-moved-to-china 
[https://perma.cc/DL8L-U7FA] (discussing the transition of manufacturing 
employment from the North to the South, and then to China and elsewhere abroad).  
See generally  H. Peter Gray, East Asia: The Growth Center of the Late Twentieth Century, 
in GLOBALIZATION AND EAST ASIA: OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES 15 (Khosrow 
Fatemi ed., 2006) (analyzing the economic and social developments in East Asia 
during the late 1900s to the early 2000s). 
 95 See Toshihiko Emi, Steelmaking Technology for the Last 100 Years: Towards 
Highly Efficient Mass Production Systems for High Quality Steels, 55 ISIJ Iɴᴛ’ʟ 36, 36 
(2015) (describing the progress of steelmaking technology over the past 100 years, 
including the industry’s tendency to go through boom-and-bust cycles, and 
arguing that steel mills must be equipped with the most cutting-edge equipment in 
order to remain competitive, such that the lack of capital improvements has a 
substantial adverse impact on the steel industry); see also Mark J. Perry, The Main 
Reason for the Loss of US Steel Jobs is a Huge Increase in Worker Productivity, Not Imports, 
and the Jobs Aren’t Coming Back, AEIDEAS (Mar. 13, 2018), 
http://www.aei.org/publication/the-main-reason-for-the-loss-of-us-steel-jobs-is-
productivity-and-technology-not-imports-and-theyre-not-coming-back 
[https://perma.cc/EHS7-MGN6] (discussing American steel manufacturing 
trends and the use of efficient mini-mills). 
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competition and failure to invest in infrastructure, the steel industry 
went through a substantial dislocation overseas.96 
By 2017, the largest global producer of steel was China at 808 
million metric tons annually.97  In 2017, by contrast, the United States 
produced about 82 million metric tons.98  U.S. Steel Corporation, 
America’s largest steel manufacturer, produced only about 14 
million metric tons of steel in 2015—compared to Luxembourg’s 
ArcelorMittal at 97 million.99  Contrast U.S. Steel and its company 
town of Gary, Indiana, formerly known as “Magic City,” with the 
rising Chinese steel manufacturer Baowu Steel.  The mill in Gary had 
employed 100,000 before cutting back to 20,000 in the early 1980s.  
                                                             
 96 See Lydia Chavez, Bethlehem Steel to Cut 7,300 Jobs at Upstate Plant, N.Y. TIMES 
(Dec. 28, 1982), https://www.nytimes.com/1982/12/28/business/bethlehem-
steel-to-cut-7300-jobs-at-upstate-plant.html [https://perma.cc/ZM8L-KE8H] 
(“The 82-year-old Lackawanna plant, one of the oldest in the country, was a victim 
of more modern and more cost-efficient operations in Europe, Japan and a number 
of third world countries, which have recently developed steel industries.  As a 
result of this competition, American steel companies have closed inefficient plants 
periodically in recent years, reducing capacity from 160 million tons in 1977 to 153 
million this year.”); U.S. Dep’t of Commerce Int’l Trade Admin., Steel Import Reports: 
The United States, GLOBAL STEEL TRADE MONITOR, Dec. 2017, 
https://www.trade.gov/steel/countries/pdfs/2017/q3/imports-us.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3E9E-UKKC] (providing figures on the United States’ imports 
of steel and finding that the United States, the world’s largest steel importer, “has 
maintained a persistent trade deficit in steel products for over a decade.”).  See also 
Tyler Denk, By the Numbers (China Steel Production), MORNING BREW (Sept. 25, 2017), 
https://www.morningbrew.com/stories/by-the-numbers-china-steel-production 
[https://perma.cc/DPX7-2UKV] (discussing China’s steel production surplus and 
noting that it resulted in a 39% decrease in U.S. steel prices in Q4 of 2015). 
 97 See TOP 10 LARGEST STEEL PRODUCING COUNTRIES IN THE WORLD, STEEL-
TECHNOLOGY.COM, https://www.steel-technology.com/articles/top-largest-steel-
producing-countries-in-the-world [https://perma.cc/YD8F-2HYF] (last visited 
Dec. 14, 2018) (“China surpassed all goals and reached a staggering 808.4 million 
metric tons of crude steel in 2016,” and  “witnessed an unimaginable growth of 
364% since 2009.”). 
 98 STEEL PRODUCTION FIGURES IN THE U.S. FROM 2006 TO 2017, STATISTA, 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/209343/steel-production-in-the-us/ 
[https://perma.cc/NR99-SGL3] (last visited Dec. 14, 2018) (“In 2017, around 82 
million metric tons of steel was produced here.  Basic oxygen furnaces accounted 
for 32 percent of the country’s total steel production.”). 
 99 See WORLD STEEL ASSOC., WORLD STEEL IN FIGURES 8 (2016), 
https://www.worldsteel.org/en/dam/jcr:1568363d-f735-4c2c-a1da-
e5172d8341dd/World+Steel+in+Figures+2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/KZJ9-
8QYC] (detailing the statistics of world steel production by country and by 
producer in 2015). 
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Now, the city is plagued by unemployment or underemployment, 
crime, poverty, and untreated drug addiction.100  Baowu Steel, on 
the other hand, currently employs about 230,000 people—mainly in 
rural, semi-industrialized areas.101 
These developments are major contributors to the economic 
insecurity of the America’s Chronically Excluded.  Following the 
loss of manufacturing jobs, the services industry provided a natural 
outlet for the Chronically Excluded.  In the next Section, we discuss 
how high-gear globalized integration is on the verge of displacing 
opportunities provided by the services industry and shifting them 
to the Global Middle Class. 
4.3.  The Globalization of Services 
Until 1995, the liberalization of the global markets—except in the 
case of regional economic arrangements like the European common 
market—only affected goods.  In 1995, the General Agreement on 
Trade in Services (GATS) was implemented as a result of the 
Uruguay Round.102  This launched a round of outsourcing of 
services in several industries.  Industries with the highest rate of 
outsourcing have been informational technology, banking and 
financial services, and life sciences and health care.  In the field of 
medical transcription services, for example, the value of globalized 
services was $41.4 billion in 2012 and it is expected to reach $60.6 
                                                             
 100 See Don Terry, Where Work Disappears and Dreams Die, AM. PROSPECT (July 
2, 2012), http://prospect.org/article/where-work-disappears-and-dreams-die 
[https://perma.cc/8PDF-2NTR]  (chronicling life in Gary, Indiana following the 
departure of manufacturing jobs over the last couple of decades); Urban Exploration: 
Gary, Indiana, Ghost Town, FORBIDDEN-PLACES, http://www.forbidden-
places.net/urban-exploration-gary-indiana-ghost-town?cmtx_page=77#1 
[https://perma.cc/J6LX-NC5S]  (last visited Feb. 5, 2018) (compiling comments of 
current and former residents of Gary, Indiana and their impressions of the town 
following the departure of manufacturing jobs). 
 101 See China Baowu Steel Group Officially Established, STEEL ORBIS (Dec. 1, 2016), 
https://www.steelorbis.com/steel-news/latest-news/china-baowu-steel-group-
officially-established-961443.htm [https://perma.cc/T22L-TXRG] (noting that 
China Baowu, the world’s second-largest steel producer, employs 228,000 people). 
 102 General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, 1869 U.N.T.S. 
183, 33 I.L.M. 1153 (1994). 
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billion in 2019.103  Countries like India and the Philippines are widely 
viewed as reliable places to outsource services.  The medical 
transcription industry is closely related to the growth of the health-
care market.  The passage of the ACA and the Patient Protection Act 
increased the incentives to outsource.  In 2012, about 60% of all 
medical transcription services were outsourced.104 
The gradual increase in outsourcing of services affects the 
United States markets in three major respects that are relevant to our 
analysis.  First, there is a substantial body of research showing that 
outsourcing impacts mainly lower-skilled services jobs.105  Here 
again, technological advancement combines with lower wages to 
displace American opportunities.  In addition, the evidence 
supports the conclusion that outsourcing suppresses wages for the 
jobs that remain in the United States.106  The upshot is that the 
outsourcing of services that came in the wake of the GATS has a 
disparate impact on the Chronically Excluded.  The lower-waged 
jobs that they transitioned to are structurally bound to become as 
tradable as the manufacturing jobs.107 
The third and potentially most harmful impact of the tradability 
of services jobs is that, combined with the technology revolution, the 
                                                             
 103 Global Medical Transcription Services Market to be Driven by Developing 
Healthcare IT Industry, TRANSPARENCY MKT. RES. (Jan. 29, 2016), 
https://www.transparencymarketresearch.com/pressrelease/medical-
transcription-services.htm [https://perma.cc/65K8-8ELZ]. 
 104 Global Medical Transcription Services Market, CISION PR NEWSWIRE (Feb. 9, 
2015), https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/global-medical-
transcription-services-market-300032951.html [https://perma.cc/6KNV-W3BG]. 
 105 See, e.g., Avraham Ebenstein, Ann Harrison, Margaret McMillan & 
Shannon Phillips, Estimating the Impact of Trade and Offshoring on American Workers 
Using the Current Population Surveys, 96 REV. ECON. & STAT. 581, 582 (2014) (finding 
that ”workers in routine occupations, such as those employed in blue-collar 
production occupations, have suffered the greatest losses from globalization.”). 
 106 See id. (“We examine the impact of globalization on U.S. workers by 
focusing attention on how they are affected by imports, exports, and offshoring to 
low- and high-income countries.  Our results indicate that a 10% increase in 
occupational exposure to import competition is associated with nearly a 3.0% 
decline in real wages for workers who perform routine tasks among workers in our 
1984 to 2002 sample and a 4.4% decline for workers taken from 1997 to 2002.”). 
 107 See id. (“[W]e find that occupation switching due to trade led to real wage 
losses of 12 to 17 percentage points between 1984 and 2002.  Any analysis of the 
wage effects of globalization that is restricted to manufacturing workers would 
miss the downward pressure on wages resulting from workers leaving 
manufacturing and entering the service sector.”(footnote omitted)). 
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next frontier in the tradability of American jobs will, by most 
accounts, involve the retail services industry.  For the Chronically 
Excluded, economic opportunity in the retail services industry has 
been an essential component of financial survival.  Beyond 
providing a lifeline to former manufacturing communities in the 
heartland, retail has also sheltered urban areas from the kind of 
economic stagnation and lack of security that has plagued 
manufacturing.  However, the decline of the services industry is 
highly likely to substantially impact this retail services fallback 
option. 
For example, in early 2017 retail stores began a major wave of 
closures.108  The rise of e-commerce joins extraordinary advances in 
information technology, individualized delivery and shipping, and 
the diversification of an American corporation dedicated to the 
maximization of capital.109  More Americans are shopping on e-
retailers like Amazon for an increasingly wide array of products.110  
Amazon is investing in delivery technology, such as drones, that 
“Wal-Martize” the individual consumer.111  No longer is a retailer’s 
economy of scale, and a visit to a physical store, necessary to import 
a Chinese product into the American living room.  Leveraging 
profits from its streaming services and other cash-earning divisions, 
Amazon can invest in distribution centers that, in time, will make 
                                                             
 108 See Suzanne Kapner, Brick-and-Mortar Stores Are Shuttering at a Record Pace, 
Wᴀʟʟ Sᴛ. J. (Apr. 21, 2017, 7:53 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/brick-and-
mortar-stores-are-shuttering-at-a-record-pace-1492818818 
[https://perma.cc/6CZE-3MSV] (detailing the increased rate of store closures by 
American retailers due to decades of overbuilding and the rise of online shopping). 
 109 See generally  JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE (1967) 
(detailing the impact of technological advances and innovation on the evolution of 
the American industrial system). 
 110 See Tracey Wallace, 2018 Omni-Channel Buying Report, BɪɢCᴏᴍᴍᴇʀᴄᴇ, 
https://www.bigcommerce.com/blog/omni-channel-retail/ 
[https://perma.cc/RN5A-EGKL] (describing consumer shopping habits in 2018 by 
generation and buying destination channels). 
 111 See Michael Lierow et al, Amazon is Using Logistics to Lead a Retail Revolution, 
FORBES (Feb. 18, 2016, 4:39 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/oliverwyman/2016/02/18/amazon-is-using-
logistics-to-lead-a-retail-revolution/#2c7132aa4e43 [http://perm.cc/D5WA-
TTRK] (describing Amazon’s experimentation in delivery logistics to find more 
ways to customize delivery options for the individual consumer). 
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each American consumer an import enterprise with an almost 
unfettered capacity to shop China’s factors.112 
The globalized marketplace in services provides opportunities 
for American businesses.  Those opportunities tend to be at the 
higher end of the spectrum, where the U.S. has been a successful 
exporter.  The Chronically Excluded, however, are generally ill-
equipped to compete in high-skilled services sectors.  Consider, by 
way of example, the breakdown of the export of U.S. services to 
China: 
 
Not only do the bulk of the economic opportunities involve 
higher-skilled services, but they tend to be based in major 
metropolitan areas.  This exacerbates the regional imbalances that 
the tradability of jobs in the manufacturing sector has caused, and 
the attendant impact on the Chronically Excluded.113 
                                                             
 112 See generally Jean-Francois Houde, Peter Newberry & Katia Seim, Economies 
of Density in E-Commerce: A Study of Amazon’s Fulfillment Center Network (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 23361, 2017), 
https://www.nber.org/papers/w23361.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZZW5-GQ9B] 
(investigating economies of scale in distribution through Amazon case study and 
discussing the fulfillment center investment business model).  See generally Ben 
Fractenberg,  Amazon Distribution Center on Staten Island to Bring 2,250 Full-Time Jobs, 
DNAINFO (Sept. 6, 2017, 2:56 PM), https://www.dnainfo.com/new-
york/20170906/bloomfield/amazon-facility-staten-island 
[https://perma.cc/2D5L-C9VC] (discussing how the establishing of an Amazon 
distribution center will create thousands of new jobs, putting New York at the 
forefront of the “growing global innovation economy.”). 
 113 For discussion and analysis of regional imbalances, see MORETTI, supra note 
80. 
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As we explained above, the high-gear globalized integration 
manifested itself beyond transforming the nature of the global 
markets.  In the following Section, we will explore the changes in the 
nature of work and the corporation that characterize the rising GEC 
3.0 economic order.  Here as well, we will not only explore the 
impact of the changes on the place of the American economy in the 
GEC, but focus in particular on their negative adverse effect on the 
Chronically Excluded. 
4.4.  Changes in the Nature of Work and the Corporation 
The economic model for the nature of work and the role of the 
corporation in labor markets has shifted in the early stages of GEC 
3.0.114  The relationship of mutual dependence between labor and 
capital that characterized GEC 2.0 has eroded.  Economists like 
Gerald Davis of the University of Michigan have identified salient 
changes in the nature of the corporation and work that are pertinent 
to our analysis.  During the first half-century of trade after World 
War II, the government partnered up with corporations with large 
workforces.  Substantial revenues and a rich balance sheet went 
hand-in-hand with a need for a stable staff.  The middle class thrived 
with this system.  The government regulated the market, the 
corporations, and provided a safety net for those who fell off the 
grid.115 
The entrepreneurial Middle Class of GEC 3.0, including the 
high-tech platform economy,116 does not create jobs on a scale 
comparable to the dominant enterprises of the 20th century, in 
                                                             
 114 See DAVIS, CAPITAL MARKETS, supra note 56.  For an analysis of the 
emergence of the “sharing economy”, see ARUN SUNDARAJAN, THE SHARING 
ECONOMY: THE END OF EMPLOYMENT AND THE RISE OF CROWD-BASED CAPITALISM, 1–
18; 108–130 (2016). 
 115 See DAVIS, CAPITAL MARKETS, supra note 56. 
 116 See Antonia Davlia et al., The Rise and Fall of Startups: Creation and 
Destruction of Revenue and Jobs by Young Companies, 40 AUST. J. MGM’T. 6, 26 (2015) 
(discussing how “Discovery-type startup ventures build head count, but then 
encounter technical or market problems that cause a reversal of proper growth,” 
particularly in the life sciences area where front-end investments are more readily 
available to explore the potential of new technologies). 
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particular those involved in the manufacturing and sale of goods.117  
Kodak and other companies with high-value balance sheets and 
assets would employ hundreds of thousands of workers and rely on 
the stability of a career workforce.118  Today, a company like Uber is 
valued at tens of billions of dollars, while employing only 
approximately 16,000 individuals.119  Trade-dependent companies 
such as Walmart have grown to be the principal mass suppliers of 
jobs in the United States, even as traditional employers in the 
services or manufacturing sectors (such as General Electric) are 
shrinking.120 
In addition, we are moving increasingly from a career to a job- 
or task- based (gig-based) economy, while automation is further 
                                                             
 117 See Michael Spence, The Impact of Globalization on Income and Employment, 90 
FOREIGN AFF. 28, 30 (2011) (“Dramatic new labor-saving technologies in the 
information services eliminated some jobs across the whole U.S. economy . . . many 
manufacturing activities . . . have been moving to emerging economies.  This trend 
is causing employment to fall in virtually all of the U.S. manufacturing sector . . . .”). 
 118 See GERALD F. DAVIS, THE VANISHING AMERICAN CORPORATION: NAVIGATING 
THE HAZARDS OF A NEW ECONOMY, 44, 88 (2016) [hereinafter DAVIS, VANISHING 
AMERICAN CORPORATION] (“Both [Sony and Eastman Kodak] had large and loyal 
workforces and large obligations to their employees and communities.  Their ability 
to meet those obligations is what made them stable employers and good citizens.”).  
Corporations were once healthily melded to American middle-class life—many 
Americans were securely employed with large companies.  Modern day 
corporations like Facebook and Zulily are different than Walmart and McDonalds, 
for example.  They employ fewer people in fewer locations around the United States 
and require a very particular skill set for employment.  See, e.g., id. at 92 (discussing 
how, in spite of its large market capitalization, Facebook employs a comparatively 
tiny number of employees). 
 119 See Samantha Kelly, Inside Uber: How the Company Attracts Top Talent Despite 
Its Reputation, CNN (Feb. 22, 2017, 3:39 AM), 
http://money.cnn.com/2017/02/14/technology/uber-corporate-
culture/index.html. [https://perma.cc4N8T-XKCP] (discussing how Uber has 
attracted over 10,000 “non-driver” workers); UBER, COMPANY INFO, 
https://www.uber.com/newsroom/company-info/ [https://perma.cc/5ALN-
LK6V] (last visited Nov. 13, 2018) (“There are over 16,000 employees at Uber as of 
2017”); see also DAVIS, CAPITAL MARKETS, supra note 56, at 1–2 (discussing the rise of 
the gig economy and noting that “[b]y the end of 2014, Uber had more driver-
partners in the U.S. than General Motors had employees.”).  See generally David Lee, 
Uber Fires 20 Staff After Harassment Investigation, BBC NEWS (June 7, 2017), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/business-40179472 [https://perma.cc/6VEU-SX9R] 
(discussing Uber’s harassment investigation among employees). 
 120 See DAVIS, VANISHING AMERICAN CORPORATION, supra note 118 (discussing 
companies meeting obligations and the relation to loyal workforces and corporate 
governance). 
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displacing the opportunities that have been natural outlets for 
dislocated manufacturing actors.121  The national constitutional 
structure, in particular the welfare system at the disposal of the 
national government, does not adequately address the 
transformation of the market.  The welfare system is constructed on 
a career-based model of employment.122  Consider, for example, the 
unemployment and minimum wage schemes.  The welfare system 
recognizes that unemployment may occur in between stable jobs.  In 
the absence of income from the career job, the State will provide a 
substitute source of income.123  Virtually all welfare schemes can be 
explained and understood in relation to this model of work.  
Disability insurance presupposes the existence of adequate jobs 
which the worker has become unable to perform by reason of 
physical or mental illness.124  Retirement funds assume a steady 
career-worth of contributions to a social scheme that is responsible 
for payouts to workers concluding their careers.125 
                                                             
 121 See LOUIS HYMAN, TEMP: HOW AMERICAN WORK, AMERICAN BUSINESS, AND 
THE AMERICAN DREAM BECAME TEMPORARY, 127–41 (2018) (discussing generally the 
increasingly temporary or gig aspect of work and how the rise of automation 
transformed available jobs from full-time to temporary and consultancy work).  The 
next phase in the impact of information technology on work will be in the fields of 
Artificial Intelligence and Robotics.  See generally RICHARD BALDWIN, THE GLOBOTICS 
UPHEAVAL: GLOBALISATION, ROBOTICS AND THE FUTURE OF WORK (2019). 
 122 See RICK WARTZMAN & PETER SAUNDERS, THE ENDS AND MEANS OF WELFARE 
WITH ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN AUSTRILIA 95 (2002) (“[T]he emergence of 
mass unemployment has had fundamental consequences for the welfare state.  
Widespread unemployment has brought into question the relevance and viability 
of many welfare programs that were designed on the assumption of full 
employment.”).  See generally RICK WARTZMAN, THE END OF LOYALTY: THE RISE AND 
FALL OF GOOD JOBS IN AMERICA  4, 7  (2017) (discussing the origins of welfare in the 
“corporate welfare” system through which large corporations, such as Eastman 
Kodak, provided a steady and increasing income along with robust benefits 
packages through employment over the life of a worker). 
 123 See generally Kenneth Casebeer, Unemployment Insurance, American Social 
Wage, Labor Organization, and Legal Ideology, 35 BOS. COLL. L. Rᴇᴠ. 259 (1994) 
(discussing the role of organized labor in the enactment of the Unemployment 
Insurance component of the Social Security Act). 
 124 See Matthew Diller, Entitlement and Exclusion: The Role of Disability in the 
Social Welfare System, 44 UCLA L. Rᴇᴠ. 361, 362 (1996) (“All of our public benefit 
programs attempt to reconcile the demand of the market economy for labor and the 
concomitant moral obligation to work, with a desire to help those in need.”). 
 125 In countries like France where a minimum guaranteed income exists, the 
State also recognizes that in extreme cases some market actors fall completely off 
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Notwithstanding those structural changes, neither national 
governments like that of the United States, nor the International 
Institutions of trade, have upgraded their basic norms and 
institutional frameworks to adjust to the GEC 3.0 reality.  This is the 
root of the current crisis of legitimacy.  In the next Part, we will start 
by outlining our understanding of what gives a GEC legitimacy, and 
then move on to proposing reforms for both the International 
Institutions and State Law. 
5.  WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? 
What gives an international legal system its legitimacy?  Is it 
principally its formal acceptance after a national constitutional 
process, such as the ratification of a treaty by a national assembly 
with the requisite vote?  To what extent does the system require 
social acceptance by the national constituents of its member 
States?126  And what happens when the public mood shifts?  Can the 
existence of the international system be conditioned on its continued 
acceptance by the national constituents?  Can an international 
system “pause” during a period of crisis to allow the participating 
States to rethink basic norms and to restructure and reclaim eroding 
legitimacy?  If that is the case, at what point does a sufficiently 
pronounced decrease in the popularity of a system become cause for 
declaring it illegitimate?  And what is a State to do about it: 
unilaterally dissolve, restructure, or attempt to renegotiate a treaty? 
These questions lie at the core of the challenges that international 
trade and international economic integration regimes across the 
                                                             
the social grid.  For them, a small monthly handout (approximately 500 euros in 
France) ensures their ability to live with a minimum amount of dignity. 
 126 See generally Thomas M. Franck, Legitimacy in the International System,  82 
Aᴍ. J. Iɴᴛ’ʟ L. 705 (1988) (discussing broadly how states obey international law even 
though it is voluntary); Ian Hurd, Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics, 
53 Iɴᴛ’ʟ Oʀɢ. 379 (1999) (addressing reasons that states abide by the international 
system, and discussing that the legitimacy of international law is not so black and 
white as many believe from a theoretical or empirical standpoint); Julia Black, 
Constructing and Contesting Legitimacy and Accountability in Polycentric Regulatory 
Regimes, 2008 REG. & GOVERNANCE 137 (explaining the dynamic between 
transnational regulatory systems in terms of legitimacy and accountability and in 
turn how regulators respond to them). 
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modern liberal democratic world are facing today.  Whether we 
view legitimacy from a formal or social acceptance point of view, it 
is undeniable that the international economic system is going 
through a crisis of legitimacy.  Our claim is that the crisis of 
legitimacy, and the rise of economic nationalism, is a direct result of 
the rise of a new Class of interlocutors of the State and of the GEC, 
which we have identified as the Chronically Excluded.127  Our 
theory of legitimacy hearkens back to the relationship between the 
Global Economic Constitution and the State’s internal constitutional 
construct.  In order to understand this relationship, we must first 
identify those interlocutors of the State whose collective acceptance 
of the international system translates into its legitimacy.  Who are 
the people whose opinions matter so much that, as a group, they can 
confer legitimacy on the international regime?  Our claim is that, in 
GEC 1.0, Capital and the limited, nascent Middle Class that 
collaborated with it to industrialize were the Stakeholders whose 
acceptance of the system was necessary for it to achieve legitimacy.  
In GEC 2.0, the expanded Middle Class—including Labor and 
Capital with constitutionally aligned interests—comprised the 
Stakeholders.128 
In GEC 3.0, two related phenomena have developed: First, Labor 
and Capital have become misaligned.  Capital is once again a Class 
of its own with interests in globalized markets at odds with those of 
Labor.  Second, the Chronically Excluded have broken away from 
the Middle Class.  This means that the Middle Class base of 
interlocutors who conferred legitimacy on GEC 2.0 now includes a 
large and growing segment that does not accept the system as it 
currently stands.  Meanwhile, as we have explained above, the State 
and the International Institutions have continued to operate based 
on a system designed for GEC 2.0.  Furthermore, all of the GEC 3.0 
economic trends that we have identified show that the increasingly 
greater numbers of Middle Class members in the United States will 
                                                             
 127 This is not simply a matter of “populism.”  See Duane Swank & Hans-
Georg Betz, Globalization, the Welfare State and Right-Wing Populism in Western 
Europe, 1 SOCIO-ECON. Rᴇᴠ. 215 (2003) (presenting empirical evidence implying that 
the social legitimacy of international trade is affected by national systems of social 
protection). 
 128 See GERALD F. DAVIS, MANAGED BY THE MARKETS: HOW FINANCE RE-SHAPED 
AMERICA (2009) (discussing the impact of shareholders on business and economic 
models). 
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be excluded from the integration enterprise.  As tradability takes on 
new forms, fueled by technological advances and transformation of 
the nature of jobs and Capital, the ranks of the Chronically Excluded 
and their insecurity are bound to deepen.129 
In this Part, we outline, in broad terms, the reforms that GEC 
should undertake nationally and internationally in order to upgrade 
to its 3.0 version. 
5.1.  The Temptation of Protectionism 
Economic nationalism and populism call for a return to the 
policies of protectionism that have characterized GEC 1.0.  While we 
argue below for a certain measure of protection for the most 
vulnerable segments of the U.S. markets, we categorically reject the 
notion that a return to protectionism would be beneficial for the U.S. 
economy (or the global markets).  Those measures would constitute 
a return to policies that ceased making sense about a century ago.  
As we have argued, the tradability of jobs is not simply a matter of 
lower labor costs or access to resources, which can be offset by 
tariffs.  Instead, the liberalization of the globalized markets is the 
product of regional conglomeration, long-standing export-
promotion policies, changes in the nature of work and the 
corporation, historical levels of national investment, automation, 
and other complex mechanisms which can no longer be reversed.  If 
the United States sought to gain an advantage in the global markets 
by imposing tariffs or other old-fashioned forms of protectionism, it 
would simply create a vacuum that would be filled by other trading 
States. 
We also believe that it is possible to maintain an international 
trade system that fosters growth while preserving national 
democratic mechanisms and achieving adequate levels of 
redistributive justice, provided that reforms are implemented to 
upgrade the United States welfare system to GEC 3.0 levels.  
                                                             
 129 See Dani Rodrik, After Neoliberalism What? (Aug. 2002) (unpublished 
manuscript), http://cemi.ehess.fr/docannexe/file/2787/rodrik2002.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/6XB4-GC49] (rejecting the view that Western governments can 
impose a set of reforms that fit neatly into developing economies, and arguing that 
any blueprints must take into account local circumstances and needs). 
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Professor Dani Rodrik, one of the most thoughtful economic voices 
commenting on economic nationalism, developed an “impossibility 
theorem” to make sense of the global economy.  He sees it defined 
by three components:  the Nation State, democracy and deep global 
economic integration.  In the tension between the Nation State and 
democracy, Rodrik believes that “hyper-globalization” undermines 
democracy.130 
In fact, Rodrik speculates that the global surge in populism is the 
“nation” pushing back against loss of control over the domestic 
economy.  He speaks of a “trilemma,” which makes it impossible to 
maintain Nation State, democracy, and globalization all at once.  In 
his construct, only a combination of two of the three structures can 
be maintained.  Rodrik sees the Nation State as indispensable to 
economic prosperity.  The reason the Nation State is so essential to 
the global economy is that it is only in virtue of the institutional 
structures found in Nation States that the economy can be viable not 
just for the wealthy one percent but for everyone.  Of course, 
democratic governance is an indispensable component of the Nation 
States.  The upshot is that globalization must be stopped in order for 
a democratic Nation State to remain viable.  Populism is a reaction 
to globalization’s undermining of the domestic infrastructure that 
delivers economic prosperity to the nation. 
The Nation State is important both to the global economy and to 
the people of the nations that have pushed back against the 
expansion of cosmopolitanism and global trade.  But we think that 
Rodrik’s account of why the Nation State is important is misguided 
in several important ways.  Most importantly, we think that Rodrik 
misunderstands and thus mischaracterizes how the Nation State can 
prosper in an age of increasing globalization.131  First, the economic 
ills, present and future, of the United States and the other wealthy 
nations of the world cannot be cured unless these States upgrade 
their policy and regulatory tools.  The displaced coal worker in West 
Virginia or the auto worker in Detroit will not find any relief from 
their economic distress through anything the Nation State might do 
for them with its existing regulatory tools.  What is needed above all 
else is a shift from a welfare model to one where the State’s basic 
obligation to the nation is to increase the availability of economic 
                                                             
 130 See DANI RODRIK, THE GLOBALIZATION PARADOX 184–207 (2011). 
 131 See generally QUINN SLOBODIAN, GLOBALISTS: THE END OF EMPIRE AND THE 
BIRTH OF NEOPLIBERALISM (2018) (providing an account of the history of 
neoliberalism and the importance of states). 
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opportunity.  Second, the United States should not reject 
globalization but, instead, couple the necessary overhaul of the 
welfare regime with upgraded trade policies designed to turn the 
global supply chain to its benefit.    
We take on these policy proposals seriatim below, starting with 
the overhaul of the welfare-delivery system. 
5.2.  Rethinking Economic Security and Opportunity:  the DIP 
Government exists to deliver order to an otherwise Hobbesian 
universe.132  Since GEC 2.0 became the global economic constitution, 
the government’s legitimacy depends on its success in delivering 
welfare to the Middle Class.  Today, as detailed above, the policy 
tools of GEC 2.0 are no longer effective.  The corporate welfare 
platform has significantly eroded and can no longer be counted on 
by the government to provide front-line delivery to a significant 
segment of the Middle Class.133  The technological revolution, the 
rise of the Global Middle Class, changes in the nature of work,  and 
the globalization of markets into regional and industrial 
overlapping associations have also hindered the government’s 
ability to deliver welfare using GEC 2.0 tools. 
Instead of regulating the corporate base, and providing a social 
safety net assuming its existence, the government must become a 
nimble, proactive partner with the individual citizen.134  We call the 
shift in regulatory focus “person-centered welfare.”  Its gist is to 
remove obstacles to economic opportunity, whether they are lack of 
skills, geographical immobility, or inability to compete in a platform 
market, to create a branch of government that would become “the 
address” for the Chronically Excluded to maintain economic 
security, and for the Middle Class generally to have access to 
meaningful economic security programs consistent with GEC 3.0. 
                                                             
 132 See generally ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA (1974) 
(discussing the role of government and advocating for a minimal state). 
 133 See Francis Fukuyama, The Future of History: Can Liberal Democracy Survive 
the Decline of the Middle Class?, 91 FOREIGN AFF. 53, 58–59 (2012) (positing that the 
social contract in developing countries is coming under pressure as middle class 
incomes fall or stagnate due to globalization and outsourcing). 
 134 Some characteristics of the system we propose could be found in the 
Danish welfare system.  See generally Per Kongshøj Madsen, The Danish Model of 
Flexicurity: A Paradise—with Some Snakes, in LABOUR MARKET AND SOCIAL 
PROTECTION REFORMS IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 243, 244–57 (Hedva Sarfati & 
Giuliano Bonoli eds., 2002). 
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The Administrative State regulating the market, its corporations, 
and actors, does not disappear in our model.  We still need a 
Securities and Exchange Commission to protect investors and 
promote disclosure.  Environmental and labor agencies are still 
needed, and so are banking and other regulators whose jobs are to 
protect the economy against market failures.  However, in order to 
successfully address the early challenges of GEC 3.0, the State must 
adopt a role closer to an indicative planner, provider of necessary 
resources, and general source of support for the Middle Class and, 
in particular, the growing class of people who have been falling 
through the GEC 2.0 regulatory net.135 
Reforms could start with the establishment of an institution 
dedicated to planning and enabling economic opportunity.  For 
purposes of developing a plausible scenario, we will make this 
institution a new cabinet-level department, which we will call 
Department of Indicative Planning and Economic Security (the DIP).  
The job of the DIP would be to devise and manage, from a macro-
economic standpoint, programs that assist the Chronically 
Excluded, but also (as described in greater detail below) devise and 
implement policies and programs for maximizing national 
engagement with the global supply chain. 
The DIP would operate Employment and Economic Security 
Centers (EECs) across the United States.  The DIP would be charged 
with ensuring that there is a sufficient pool of national jobs and 
economic opportunity to provide for the economic welfare of the 
Middle Class, and in identifying broadly the obstacles to individual 
access to opportunity.  The EECs would operate on a micro level to 
implement and administer programs devised by the DIP. 
The job of these institutions goes well beyond the retraining of 
Chronically Excluded workers or assistance with identifying and 
securing economic opportunities, although those would also be 
important functions.  The DIP’s fundamental goal would be 
indicative:  to identify and structure the programs necessary to 
                                                             
 135 Japan, for instance, rebuilt its social and economic infrastructure after 
World War II through policies of indicative planning spearheaded by its Ministry 
of International Trade and Industry (MITI).  See MIKIO SUMIYA, A HISTORY OF 
JAPANESE TRADE AND INDUSTRY POLICY 47–49 (2000) (summarizing a 17-volume 
Japanese language history of indicative planning policies from 1945 to 1979 that had 
been commissioned by MITI). 
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maximize individual ability to compete in uncertain and rapidly 
changing markets.  By way of example:  The World Economic Forum 
is predicting that 65% of today’s elementary school children will 
work in jobs that do not exist yet.136  This raises a significant question 
with deep consequences for the future economic health of the U.S.:  
How do we educate a workforce for future markets and competition 
that we have yet to identify?  The DIP and EECs will be charged with 
that task.  This might include coordination with the Department of 
Education and local agencies to, for example, provide coding and 
other skills training for their students. 
Likewise, the DIP and the EECs would be tasked with devising 
programs to correct the regional disparities that we have identified.  
Expensive programs including subsidies and other expenditures 
have been tried in regions like coal country in Pennsylvania, as well 
as other countries that went through similar declines such as 
France’s Pas-de-Calais.137  Those programs have been met with 
limited success, in part because of the need to maintain them in place 
in order to sustain the relief that they provide.  The DIP would be 
tasked with devising innovative programs consistent with the GEC 
3.0 economic structure.  For example, the DIP could enable the 
establishment of “economic clusters” in affected regions.  
Legislation is currently pending for the creation of region-specific 
investment funds designed to enable the aggregation of 
manufacturing, customers, and developments.  Public-private 
partnerships, as well as grants to research institutions, provide 
promising prospects to establish successful counterparts to the 
special economic zones that have fueled exports abroad.  The DIP, 
                                                             
 136 See The Future of Jobs: Employment, Skills and Workforce Strategy For the Fourth 
Industrial Revolution, WORLD ECON. FORUM (2016), 
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Future_of_Jobs.pdf. 
[https://perma.cc/Y6LP-3XBQ] (“By one popular estimate, 65% of children 
entering primary school today will ultimately end up working in completely new 
job types that don’t yet exist.”). 
 137 See, e.g., Globalization Has Marginalized Many Regions in the Rich World: What 
Can be Done to Help Them, ECONOMIST (Oct. 21, 2017), 
https://www.economist.com/briefing/2017/10/21/globalisation-has-
marginalised-many-regions-in-the-rich-world [https://perma.cc/7QJK-K745] 
(illustrating the disappointing results of state subsidies in Pennsylvania to attract 
jobs and investments to chronically underperforming regions). 
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assisted by the EECs, will have jurisdiction over management of 
projects of this type. 
On a related front, one of the comparative disadvantages of the 
United States, and cause for the rise of the Chronically Excluded, is 
rising geographic immobility.  This is caused by several factors:  
retirement systems that do not provide for transferability of benefits, 
high cost of housing making moves to cities for lesser-skilled jobs 
economically infeasible, or simply the aging of the population and 
the need for elder care.  One additional concern is that, if those able 
to move to pursue opportunities do so, the problem of regional 
disparities will become even more acute because the older and/or 
less skilled population segments will be left behind.  Geographic 
mobility still makes sense for some population groups, but it is made 
difficult by structural and economic limitations such as those 
mentioned above.138  One of the jobs of the DIP and the EECs would 
be to assist in relocation, whether by way of training, linking with 
existing opportunities, or removing regulatory disincentives. 
The EECs would also operate what we conceptualize as 
comprehensive support services for the unemployed and 
marginally employed (“Employment Poles”).  The Employment 
Poles would serve as a job search center, a training school, and a 
coaching program.  The job search center would identify available 
opportunities, whether jobs or gigs.  The training school would, 
wherever possible, coordinate with potential employers the level of 
skills that displaced workers need to achieve to be placed.  The 
coaching center would assist them in applying for jobs, in 
coordinating the portable social protection system work described 
below, and in retaining employment. 
                                                             
 138 See id. (“[P]eople in the rich world are less able and willing to move to 
thriving places than in the past.  America . . . has settled down a lot.”); see also Maria 
L La Ganga, Ordinary People Can’t Afford a Home in San Francisco: How Did it Come to 
This?, Gᴜᴀʀᴅɪᴀɴ (Aug. 5, 2016), 
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/aug/05/high-house-prices-san-
francisco-tech-boom-inequality [https://perma.cc/7LA8-D8PQ] (documenting the 
housing affordability crisis in San Francisco). 
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5.3.  Portable Social Protection System 
Person-Centered Welfare should also include a portable social 
protection system that will account for the changing nature of our 
economy, including the part-time nature of gigs and business cycles 
that may include high-revenue periods as well as slumps.  Here as 
well, the DIP and the EEC would have primary responsibility for 
developing and overseeing the operations of the portable social 
protection system.  For purposes of developing a scenario that 
illustrates the general direction that we advocate, we will discuss a 
hypothetical new government tool, a “social account,” that would 
accompany citizens through their working lives.139 
The social account would both be an instrument of economic 
security and a way for the government to stimulate economic 
activity.  For economic security, social accounts would operate as a 
form of person-centered taxation.  Account holders would 
contribute to them while working or in business.  They would have 
the right to withdraw from it, in the form of a tax-free loan, in 
periods of low business.  The social account would be the repository 
of retirement savings and the link to stable, uninterrupted health 
care.140  For economic opportunity, the social account would be an 
access tool.  For example, the EECs would be the vehicle to apply for 
entrepreneurial loans or tuition aid.  Likewise, if opportunity 
seeking requires geographical relocation, then the social account 
could be used for that purpose.  Portable social accounts have been 
discussed in the private and public sectors, and in scholarship.  A 
tool of that nature, in the government’s panoply, would gradually 
evolve and be refined in light of continuing experience. 
                                                             
 139 See David Rolf & Nick Hanauer, Portable Benefits for an Insecure Workforce, 
AM. PROSPECT (Feb. 23, 2017), http://prospect.org/article/portable-benefits-
insecure-workforce [https://perma.cc/XC5L-QFLW] (proposing a new system of 
portable employment benefits that accrue regardless of the worker’s status vis-à-
vis the employer). 
 140 See generally Monica Rondon, Policies to Protect Workers in the Patchwork 
Economy: Portable Benefits, Cᴇɴᴛᴜʀʏ Fᴏᴜɴᴅ. (Aug. 22, 2017), 
https://tcf.org/content/commentary/policies-protect-workers-patchwork-
economy-portable-benefits/ [https://perma.cc/4RB4-3RCA] (describing a 
portable benefits fund bill in Washington State  that “would provide workers with 
industrial insurance (workers compensation), and the option to allocate 
contributions to other benefits like health insurance, paid leave and retirement 
benefits.”). 
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5.4.  Support for Life-Long Gig Worker 
The DIP would be the government’s address for the “life-long 
entrepreneur,” creating and managing ongoing business in the new 
economy.  The State could tap into the social conscience of educated 
Americans, and create a Small Business Corps of young graduates 
of professional schools.  Those professionals would be assigned to 
EECs, and tasked with teaching, coaching, and assisting 
entrepreneurs and gig workers with the management of their 
economic activity.  Whether it be resume writing or crafting an 
application for funding the social account, the Small Business Corps 
would be deployed throughout the United States to assist.  Creative 
ways, consistent with the GEC 3.0, could be devised to raise the 
funds necessary for such a grand project.  For example, the 
government could give companies that do not repatriate profits 
because of the associated corporate tax a one-time opportunity to do 
so at a very low tax rate, say 10%.  This would be akin to the tax 
amnesty regimes that allow nationals to repatriate assets that 
previously escaped taxation, subject to drastically lowered taxation 
rates, in order to raise capital for the domestic jurisdiction.141 
5.5.  Turning the Global Supply Chain to Our Benefit:  Regional 
Agreements 
The DIP’s indicative planning functions would include devising 
and implementing trade policies intended to turn the global supply 
chain to the benefit of U.S. business.  Regional agreements are a 
powerful tool to accomplish this goal in that they can be used to 
identify export-promoting policies and lingering tariffs that hinder 
market access, such as the ones that have helped Asian 
manufacturing centers to thrive.  Although comprehensive 
agreements like the Trans-Pacific Partnership are most effective, 
regional agreements can be reached for limited periods of times to 
                                                             
 141 See, e.g.,  Gabriel Gotlib, Fernando M. Vaquero, & Maria-Paul Castelli, 
Argentina Has Released a New Amnesty Tax Regime, MONDAQ (July 11, 2016), 
http://www.mondaq.com/Argentina/x/508468/tax+authorities/Argentina+Has
+Released+a+New+Tax+Amnesty+Regime [https://perma.cc/DM9A-H7C2] 
(applying tax regime of 0% to 15%, with cap of 10% for returns filed before specified 
date).  See generally ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, THE CHESSBOARD AND THE WEB: 
STRATEGIES OF CONNECTION IN A NETWORKED WORLD (2017). 
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deal with discrete issues.  We call those “regional small-scale 
contracts.” 
As trading partners acquire ever-increasing market shares, their 
access to U.S. markets should be conditioned on the lowering of 
tariffs that today still reflect the preferential treatment given to them 
after decolonization enterprises.  For example, in Japan and 
Vietnam, import tariffs are 19% and 16%, respectively.  The TPP that 
the Trump Administration rejected included a drastic reduction of 
these tariffs.142  A small-scale contract should be negotiated with 
those countries to accomplish this tariff-reduction goal, outside the 
scope of the TPP, failing which access to the U.S. markets will be 
limited for other goods.  This is necessary to prevent agricultural 
exporters like Brazil and Russia to take over markets that would be 
natural outlets for U.S. goods.  Known as “breadbaskets”, these 
countries already take up a sizeable share of the global wheat, 
soybean, and corn marketplace.  Soybean and corn were exported 
out of Brazil at values of $19 billion143 and $4.01 billion144 annually, 
respectively.  These exports make their way to Japan and Singapore:  
markets the United States would have had access to.  Brazil’s corn 
exports to Japan were worth about $517 million in 2016.145  Russia’s 
corn exports to Japan are currently worth $30.5 million146 and would 
have been threatened by U.S. farms’ entry into the Asian market.  As 
discussed below, we believe that the GEC 3.0 international rule of 
law should permit such negotiations and the suspension of market 
access benefits if post-colonization level tariffs are not redressed. 
                                                             
 142 See Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, Annex 2-D, Feb. 4, 2016 (signed, 
not ratified), https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/trans-
pacific-partnership/tpp-full-text [https://perma.cc/9NBA-4LZN] (indicating how 
tariff schedules would be affected, either by elimination or reduction). 
 143 OEC, SOYBEANS, https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/hs92/1201/ 
[https://perma.cc/UE7X-2677]. 
 144 OEC, CORN, https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/hs92/1005/ 
[https://perma.cc/7H8T-P733]. 
 145 OEC, WHAT DOES BRAZIL EXPORT TO JAPAN? (2016), 
https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/export/bra/jpn/sho
w/2016/ [https://perma.cc/WWP8-DS59]. 
 146 OEC, WHERE DOES RUSSIA EXPORT CORN TO? (2016), 
https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/export/rus/show/10
05/2016/[https://perma.cc/EFT3-YLFZ]. 
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5.6.  Turning the Global Supply Chain to Our Benefit:  BITs 
As a result of decades of international lobbying led by the United 
States, the global marketplace is governed by a web of 
approximately 2,700 bilateral investment agreements and treaties 
including investment provisions, which give private parties a direct 
cause of action.147  The DIP would—in addition and as an auxiliary 
to its pursuit of regional agreements to maximize global supply 
chain opportunities—assist private parties in leveraging those BITs 
to identify and challenge barriers to market access.  Our trade policy 
could, for instance, give loans for legal fees in meritorious cases, act 
as a clearinghouse to pool similarly situated companies, and 
otherwise provide the resources of the government to assist in 
litigation objectives. 
5.7.  International Transitioning 
Effective measures to upgrade domestic and international trade 
policy to GEC 3.0, such as those described above, will in some 
circumstances run afoul of core principles of GEC 2.0 like the 
national treatment, anti-discrimination principle.  As we explained 
in Part I, the GEC is a constitutional construct that does not require 
timeless application of equally applied norms across generations.  
For example, distinguishing among economic actors based on their 
historical circumstances has been at the root of the trade provisions 
protecting industries in early stages of development in emerging 
economies.  The rationale is simple:  in order to meaningfully 
participate in the globalized markets, an industry must have 
reached a sufficiently advanced stage of development.  Otherwise, 
it will not be able to compete with foreign actors.  In other words, in 
order to consolidate the national base necessary to be a competitive 
GEC 2.0 actor, states that did not have a meaningful opportunity to 
develop during GEC 1.0—primarily because of colonization—could 
                                                             
 147 See generally ANDREW PAUL NEWCOMBE & LUIS PARADELL, LAW AND PRACTICE 
OF INVESTMENT TREATIES (2009) (delineating the historical development of 
investment treaty law).  For a listing of international investment agreements, 
including bilateral investment agreements and treaties including investment 
provisions, see United Nations UNCTAD, International Investment Agreements 
Navigator, INV. POL’Y HUB, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA 
[https://perma.cc/H3LZ-9D6U] (last visited Nov. 23, 2018). 
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legitimately claim the right to apply provisions that would 
otherwise be trade-violative. 
The same rationale pertains today.  Entire regions and categories 
of individuals like the Chronically Excluded Classes cannot 
meaningfully compete in GEC 3.0.  Bringing them on to the playing 
field will, inevitably, entail a suspension of some foundational 
principles.  An American worker who learns automation skills in an 
EEC program with a view to participating in an infrastructure 
project managed by the federal government should be allowed to 
bid free of competition from foreign competitors.  In this instance, a 
“Buy American” domestic program specifically designed to benefit 
a class of people that has not become a stakeholder in the trade 
system should be excluded from the prohibition against 
protectionism.148  Likewise, a pause is needed to enable the United 
States to negotiate the discrete and focused tariff reduction 
agreements described above. 
As Robert Schuman famously declared in his 1950 Declaration, 
economic and political integration is a long-haul project that evolves 
through the practical achievement of milestones that are consistent 
with an overall vision.149  The rule of international law consistently 
applied to all WTO members is a relatively recent phenomenon.  The 
international commercial system has more often than not been a 
Hobbesian world where power drove outcomes.  The United States 
historically exercised its power to enable free movement of goods 
and services and create a globalized market for decades, starting 
most significantly with the massive investment in Europe’s 
reconstruction through the Marshall Plan.150  Today, the system may 
be saved again if power is respected for the rule of law to continue 
to prevail. 
                                                             
 148 See Spence, supra note 117, at 38–39 (identifying as a starting objective an 
agreement that “restoring rewarding employment opportunities for a full spectrum 
of Americans should be a fundamental goal.”). 
 149 See Schuman, supra note 69 (“Europe will not be made all at once, or 
according to a single plan.  It will be built through concrete achievements which 
first create a de facto solidarity.”). 
 150 See generally BENN STEIL, THE MARSHALL PLAN: DAWN OF THE COLD WAR 
(2018) (discussing the importance of the Marshall Plan and how it “promised a 
continuing energetic U.S. presence, underwritten by a reindustrialized capitalist 
Germany, at the heart of an integrated, capitalist western Europe.”). 
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6.  CONCLUSION 
Explaining the causes of the challenges to the legitimacy of the 
international economic order and the rise of what has been called 
economic nationalism obviously falls beyond the scope of a single 
project.  As we explained in the Introduction, we confine ourselves 
in this article to the foundational architecture of the international 
trade norms and institutions.  Other projects, of course, look to other 
facets of this problematic order, including the cultural alienation 
that many believe the Chronically Excluded and other groups have 
been experiencing.  Our intention here is to steer the current course 
towards a reform of domestic and economic policy to adjust to the 
new GEC 3.0 conditions.  Once in motion, GEC 3.0 will grow and 
find its way to stability, like its predecessor did.  There is no 
alternative.  History teaches that failure to begin to upgrade will 
result in a systemic failure.151  Now is the time to take action and 
avoid the mistakes of the past. 
 
 
                                                             
 151 See, e.g., JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE 
PEACE (2007) (discussing the untenable economic order established after World War 
I and the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, and arguing for a more generous peace). 
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